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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems (ECCs) [1] have been recently attracting increased
attention. Standards for ECCs have been adopted by IEEE, ANSI, NIST, SEC and
WTLS [2]–[8]. The ability to use smaller key sizes and the computationally more
efficient ECC algorithms are two main reasons why elliptic curve cryptosystems
are becoming more popular. They are considered to be particularly suitable for
implementation on platforms with constrained storage and/or battery specifications,
e.g. smart cards or mobile devices.
Power analysis attacks [11] on such devices are considered serious threats due
to the physical characteristics of these devices and their use in potentially hostile
environments. Power analysis attacks seek to break the security of these devices
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through observing their power consumption trace or computations timing. Careless
or naive implementations of cryptosystems may allow power analysis attacks to infer
the secret key or obtain partial information about it. Thus, designers of such systems
strive to introduce algorithms and architectures that are not only efficient, but also
power analysis attack resistant.
Several software implementations of elliptic curve cryptosystems have been re-
ported [13]–[18]. The advantages of software implementations include ease of use,
ease of upgrade, portability, low development cost and flexibility. Their main dis-
advantages, on the other hand, are their lower performance and limited ability to
protect private keys from disclosure compared to hardware implementations. These
disadvantages have motivated many researchers to investigate efficient architectures
for hardware implementations of elliptic curve cryptosystems.
Several hardware implementations of elliptic curve cryptosystems have been re-
ported. Most proposed hardware architectures were for elliptic curves cryptosystems
defined over GF (2m) [19]–[47]. Many elliptic curve implementations over GF (p)
have also been reported, e.g., [29, 36, 37, 50–54]. Hardware implementations offer
improved speed and higher security over software implementations, because they
cannot be read or modified by an outside attacker as easily as software implemen-
tations.
Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASIC) implementations show lower
price per unit, high speeds, and low power dissipation. The main disadvantages
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of ASIC implementations, however, are higher development costs and the lack of
flexibility. Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) technology offers a good com-
promise between the speed of ASIC implementations, the short development times,
and adaptability of software implementations.
In this research, efficient elliptic curve cryptoprocessor architectures that are
resistant to known power analysis attacks have been developed. The proposed ar-
chitectures exploit parallelism and randomization to provide high performance and
resistance against power analysis attacks. These proposed architectures have been
modeled in VHSIC Hardware Description Language (VHDL) and implemented on
an FPGAs platform.
1.2 Organization of the Dissertation
This chapter provides the motivation for the work performed in this dissertation.
The remaining chapters of this dissertation are organized as follows.
Chapter 2 provides a brief introduction to GF (2m) finite field arithmetic. ECC
operations including scalar multiplication, encryption and discrete logarithm prob-
lem are also briefly explored in Chapter 2.
Chapter 3 reviews some of the most popular scalar multiplication algorithms.
Normal basis multiplication and inversion algorithms over GF (2m) are explained in
Chapter 4.
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Chapter 5 surveys techniques for power analysis attacks and FPGA implemen-
tations of ECCs. The proposed power analysis attack-resistant cryptoprocessors are
detailed in Chapter 6.
Chapter 7 presents the results of synthesizing the various cryptoprocessors and
compares these cryptoprocessors in terms of delay and area. Finally, the conclusions
and future work are given in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter provides a brief introduction to GF (2m) finite field arithmetic. ECC
operations including scalar multiplication, encryption and discrete logarithm prob-
lem are also briefly explored in this chapter.
2.1 Finite Field Arithmetic
In abstract algebra, a finite field is a field that contains only finitely many elements.
Finite fields are important in number theory, algebraic geometry, Galois theory,
coding theory, and cryptography [55]–[57].
A group is a set of elements G together with one binary operation, , which have
the following properties:
1. Closure: ∀ a, b ∈ G, a  b ∈ G.
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2. Associativity: ∀ a, b, c ∈ G, (a  b)  c = a  (b  c).
3. Identity: The group contains an identity element e ∈ G such that
∀ a ∈ G, a  e = e  a = a.
4. Inverse: Every element a ∈ G has an inverse a−1 ∈ G such that a  a−1 =
a−1  a = e.
Abelian groups are groups with commutative group operation; i.e., a  b = b  a
∀ a, b ∈ G. Cyclic groups are groups that have a generator element. An element
g ∈ G, is a generator of the group if each element a ∈ G can be generated by
repeated application of the group operation on g. Thus, ∀ a ∈ G,
a = g  g  g  ...  g︸ ︷︷ ︸
i times
(2.1)
Additive groups, are groups with the “ + ” group operator, denoted as:
ig = g + g + g + ...+ g︸ ︷︷ ︸
i times
(2.2)
Similarly, multiplicative groups, are groups with the “ ∗ ” group operator, denoted
as:
gi = g ∗ g ∗ g ∗ ... ∗ g︸ ︷︷ ︸
i times
(2.3)
The order of a group G, represented by the symbol |G|, is the number of elements
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in the group.
A field is a set of elements F with two binary operations, represented here as
addition “ + ” and multiplication “ ∗ ”, which have the following properties:
1. F is an abelian group with respect to the “ + ” operation.
2. The elements of the set F ∗ form an abelian group under the “ ∗ ” operation.
The set F ∗ is a set that contains all the elements in F except the additive
identity.
3. The distribution law applies to the two binary operations as follows:
∀ a, b, c ∈ F , a ∗ (b+ c) = (a ∗ b) + (a ∗ c).
Finite fields or Galois field, so named in honor of Evariste Galois, are represented
by the symbol GF (q). For any prime p and positive integer m, there always exists
a Galois field of order q = pm. The prime p is called the characteristic of the finite
field GF (pm).
2.2 GF (2m) Arithmetic
The finite GF (2m) field, with characteristic 2, has particular importance in cryptog-
raphy since it leads to efficient hardware implementations. Elements of the GF (2m)
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field are represented in terms of a basis. Most implementations use either a Poly-
nomial Basis or a Normal Basis. For the implementations described in this disser-
tation, a normal basis is chosen since it leads to more efficient hardware. Normal
basis is more suitable for hardware implementations than polynomial basis since
operations mainly comprise rotation, shifting and exclusive-ORing which can be ef-
ficiently implemented in hardware. A normal basis of GF (2m) is a basis of the form
(β2
m−1
, ..., β2
2
, β2
1
, β2
0
), where β ∈ GF (2m).
In a normal basis, an element A ∈ GF (2m) can be uniquely represented in the
form A =
∑m−1
i=0 αiβ
2i , where ai ∈ {0, 1}. GF (2m) operations using normal basis
are performed as follows:
1. Addition. Addition is performed by a simple bit-wise exclusive-OR (XOR)
operation.
2. Squaring. Squaring is simply a rotate left operation. Thus, if
A = (am−1, am−2, ...a1, a0), then A2 = (am−2, am−3, ...a0, am−1).
3. Multiplication. ∀ A,B ∈ GF (2m), where
A =
m−1∑
i=0
aiβ
2i and B =
m−1∑
i=0
biβ
2i ,
the product C = A ∗B, is given by:
C = A ∗B =
m−1∑
i=0
ciβ
2i
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Multiplication is defined in terms of a set of m multiplication matrices λ(k)
(k = 0, 1, ...,m− 1),
ck =
m−1∑
i=0
m−1∑
j=0
λ
(k)
ij aibj ∀ k = 0, 1, ...,m− 1
where, λ
(k)
ij ∈ {0, 1}.
The number of non-zero elements in the λ matrix defines the complexity of the
multiplication process and accordingly the complexity of its hardware imple-
mentation. This value is denoted as CN and is equal to (2m− 1) for optimal
normal basis (ONB) [58]. An optimal normal basis is one with the minimum
possible number of non-zero elements in the λij matrix. Such bases typically
lead to efficient hardware implementations since operations mainly comprise
rotation, shifting and exclusive-ORing.
Derivation of values of the λ matrix elements is dependent on the filed size
m. There are two types of optimal normal basis that are referred to as Type
I and Type II [58]. An ONB of Type I exists for a given field GF (2m) if:
(a) m+ 1 is a prime
(b) 2 is a primitive in GF (m+ 1)
On the other hand, a Type II optimal normal basis exists in GF (2m) if:
(a) 2m+ 1 is prime
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(b) either 2 is a primitive in GF (2m + 1) or 2m + 1 ≡ 3 (mod 4) and 2
generates the quadratic residues in GF (2m+ 1)
An ONB exists in GF (2m) for 23% of all possible values of m [58]. The λ(k)
matrix can be constructed by a k-fold cyclic shift to λ(0) as follows:
λ
(k)
ij = λ
(0)
i−k,j−k for all 0 ≤ i, j, k ≤ m− 1
The λ(0) matrix is derived differently for the two types of ONB. For the Type
I ONB, λ
(0)
ij = 1 iff i and j satisfy one of the following two congruences [59]:
(a) 2i + 2j ≡ 1 mod (m+ 1)
(b) 2i + 2j ≡ 0 mod (m+ 1)
For Type II ONB, λ
(k)
ij = 1 iff i and j satisfy one of the following four congru-
ences [59]:
(a) 2i + 2j ≡ 2k mod (2m+ 1)
(b) 2i + 2j ≡ −2k mod (2m+ 1)
(c) 2i − 2j ≡ 2k mod (2m+ 1)
(d) 2i − 2j ≡ −2k mod (2m+ 1)
Therefore, λ
(0)
ij = 1 iff i and j satisfy one of the following four congruences:
2i ± 2j ≡ ±1 mod (2m+ 1)
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4. Inversion. Inverse of a ∈ GF (2m), denoted as a−1, is defined as follows.
aa−1 ≡ 1 mod 2m
Most inversion algorithms are derived from Fermat’s Little Theorem, where
a−1 = a2
m−2
for all a 6= 0 in GF (2m).
2.3 Elliptic Curve Arithmetic
An elliptic curve E over the finite fieldGF (p) defined by the parameters a, b ∈ GF (p)
with p > 3, consists of the set of points P = (x, y), where x, y ∈ GF (p), that satisfy
the elliptic curve equation (Equation 2.4) together with the additive identity of the
group point O, known as the “point at infinity” [1].
y2 = x3 + ax+ b (2.4)
where a, b ∈ GF (p) and 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0 mod p.
The number of points n on an elliptic curve over a finite field GF (q) is defined
by Hasse’s theorem [56]. The set of discrete points on an elliptic curve form an
abelian group, whose group operation is known as point addition. Elliptic curve
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point addition is defined according to the “chord-tangent process”. Point addition
over GF (p) is described as follows.
Let P and Q be two distinct points on E defined over GF (p) with Q 6= −P (Q is
not the additive inverse of P ). The addition of the two points P and Q is the point
R (R = P + Q), where R is the additive inverse of S, and S is a third point on E
intercepted by the straight line through points P and Q. The additive inverse of a
point P = (x, y) ∈ E, over GF (p), is the point −P = (x,−y) which is the reflection
of the point P with respect to the x-axis on E. The addition operation over GF (p)
is depicted in Figure 2.1.
When P = Q and P 6= −P, the addition of P and Q is the point R (R = 2P ),
where R is the additive inverse of S, and S is the third point on E intercepted by
the straight line tangent to the curve at point P . This operation is referred to as
point doubling, and is shown in Figure 2.2.
Equation 2.5 defines the non-supersingular elliptic curve equation for GF (2m)
fields. Only non-supersingular curves over GF (2m) are considered since supersin-
gular curves are not secure. Supersingular elliptic curves are special class of curves
with some special properties that make them unstable for cryptography [60].
y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b (2.5)
where a, b ∈ GF (2m) and b 6= 0.
12
Figure 2.1: The point addition operation (R = P +Q) over GF (p).
Figure 2.2: The point doubling operation (R = 2P ) over GF (p).
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For a non-supersingular elliptic curve E defined over GF (2m), point addition
and point doubling operations are generally computed using the algebraic formulae
as follows:
• Identity: P +O = O + P = P for all P ∈ E.
• Negatives: If P = (x, y) ∈ E, then (x, y)+(x, x+y) = O. The point (x, x+y)
is called the negative of P , denoted as −P .
• Point Addition: Let P = (x1, y1), Q = (x2, y2) ∈ E, P 6= Q and Q 6= −P,
then P +Q = (x3, y3), where
x3 = (
y1+y2
x1+x2
)2 + ( y1+y2
x1+x2
) + x1 + x2 + a
y3 = (
y1+y2
x1+x2
) · (x1 + x3) + x3 + y1
• Point Doubling: If P = Q = (x1, y1), then 2P = P + P = (x3, y3), where
x3 = x
2
1 +
b
x21
y3 = x
2
1 + (x1 +
y1
x1
)x3 + x3
A major operation required by elliptic curve cryptosystems is the point scalar
multiplication. The scalar multiplication operation, denoted as kP , where k is an
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integer and P is a point on the elliptic curve represents the addition of k copies of
point P as given by Equation 2.6.
kP = P + P + ...+ P︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times P
(2.6)
Elliptic curve cryptosystems are built over cyclic groups. Each group contains a
finite number of points, n, that can be represented as scalar multiples of a generator
point: iP for i = 0, 1, ..., n − 1, where P is a generator of the group. The order of
point P is n, which implies that nP = O and iP 6= O for 1 < i ≤ n− 1. The order
of each point on the group must divide n. Consequently, a point multiplication kQ
for k > n can be computed as (k mod n)Q.
Projective coordinate system defines points over the projective plane as triplets
(X, Y, Z). Projective coordinate systems are used to eliminate the number of in-
versions [60]. For elliptic curve defined over GF (2m), many different forms of
formulas may be used for point addition and doubling [61]–[64]. For the Homo-
geneous coordinate system, an elliptic curve point (x, y) takes the form (x, y) =
(X/Z, Y/Z) [62], while for the Jacobian coordinate system, a point takes the form
(x, y) = (X/Z2, Y/Z3) [63]. The Lopez-Dahab coordinate system takes the form
(x, y) = (X/Z, Y/Z2) [64] and requires 14 and 5 field multiplications for point ad-
dition and point doubling respectively. This is less than the number of field multi-
plications required by both Homogenous and Jacobian coordinate systems. Tables
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Table 2.1: The Homogeneous projective coordinate system.
Addition Multiplications Doubling Multiplications
A = X1Z2 1M A = X1Z1 1M
B = X2Z1 1M B= bZ
4
1 +X
4
1 1M
C = A+B C= AX 41 1M
D = Y1Z2 1M D = Y1Z1 1M
E = Y2Z1 1M E = X
2
1 +D + A
F = D + E Z3 = A
3 1M
G = C + F X3=AB 1M
H = Z1Z2 1M Y3= C+BE 1M
I = C3+aHC 2
+HFG
5M
X3 = CI 1M
Z3 = HC
3 1M
Y3=GI+
C2[FX 1+CY 1]
4M
Total 16M 7M
2.1–2.3 show the different formulae for point operations and the required number of
field multiplications for different coordinate systems. The Mixed coordinate system
adds two points where one is given in some coordinate system while the other in
another coordinate system. The coordinate system of the resulting point, may be
in a third coordinate system [61].
2.4 Scalar Multiplication
Scalar multiplication is the basic operation for ECC process. Scalar multiplication
in the group of points of an elliptic curve is the analogous of exponentiation in
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Table 2.2: The Jacobian projective coordinate system.
Addition Multiplications Doubling Multiplications
A = X1Z
2
2 1M Z3 = X1Z
2
1 1M
B = X2Z
2
1 1M A = bZ
2
1 1M
C = A+B B = X1+A
D = Y1Z
3
2 2M X3 = B
4
E = Y2Z
3
1 2M C = Z1Y1 1M
F = D + E D = Z3 +
X21 + C
G = Z1C 1M E = DX 3 1M
H=FX2+GY 2 2M Y3 = X
4
1Z3
+E
1M
Z3 = GZ 2 1M
I = F + Z3
X3= aZ
2
3+IF
+C3
3M
Total 15M 5M
the multiplicative group of integers modulo a fixed integer m. Computing kP can
be performed using a straightforward double-and-add approach based on the binary
representation of k = (km−1, ..., k0) where km−1 is the most significant bit of k. Other
scalar multiplication methods have been proposed in the literature. A good survey
has been conducted by Gordon in [65]. These scalar multiplication algorithms are
described in detail next chapter.
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Table 2.3: The Lopez-Dahab projective coordinate system.
Addition Multiplications Doubling Multiplications
A0 = Y
2
1 Z
2
1 1M Z3 = Z
2
1X
2
1 1M
A1 = Y1Z
2
2 1M X3 = X
4
1+bZ
4
1 1M
B0 = X2Z1 1M Y3=bZ
4
1Z3+
X3(aZ 3 + Y
2
1
+bZ 41)
3M
B1 = X1Z2 1M
C = A0 + A1
D = B0 +B1
E = Z1Z2 1M
F=DE 1M
Z3 = F
2
G = D2(F
+aE 2)
2M
H=CF 1M
X3 = C2+H
+G
I = D2B0E
+X3
2M
J = D2A0 +
X3
1M
Y3=HI+Z 3J 2M
Total 14M 5M
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2.5 Elliptic Curve Encryption
Several approaches were proposed to employ elliptic curves for encryption/decryption.
These include elliptic curve analogs of most popular public key protocols such as
elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman and elliptic curve ElGamal [59].
2.5.1 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Protocol
In Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Protocol, the base point P and the elliptic curve
equation are public. User’s A private and public keys are kA and PA = kAP respec-
tively. User’s B, on the other hand, private and public keys are kB and PB = kBP
respectively. The message to be encrypted is embedded into the x -coordinate of a
point on the elliptic curve (Pm = (xm, ym))[59]. The shared secret key S between
two parties A and B is easily calculated by
S = kA(kBP ) = kB(kAP )
Whenever one of the users need to send a message to the other party, he needs to
add the shared secret key to the message to produce the ciphertext point PC given
by
PC = Pm + S
To decrypt the ciphertext point, the secret key is subtracted from the ciphertext
point to give the plaintext point Pm given by
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Pm = Pc − S
2.5.2 Elliptic Curve ElGamal Protocol
In elliptic curve ElGamal protocol, for some user to encrypt and send the message
point Pm to user A, he chooses a random integer “l” and generates the ciphertext
which consists of the following pair of points:
Cm = (lP, Pm + lPA)
The ciphertext pair of points uses A’ s public key, where only user A can decrypt
the plaintext using his private key. To decrypt the ciphertext Cm, the first point in
the pair of Cm, lP, is multiplied by A’ s private key to get the point: kA(lP ). This
point is subtracted from the second point of Cm to produce the plaintext point Pm.
The complete decryption operations are:
Pm = (Pm + lPA)− kA(lP ) = Pm + l(kAP )− kA(lP )
2.6 Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem
The Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) is defined as follows:
Given a known elliptic curve and two known points on the curve P and Q, the
ECDLP is to find an integer 0 ≤ k ≤ m − 1, such that Q = kP if such a number
exists.
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P is called the base point while k is known as the elliptic curve discrete logarithm
of Q with respect to P (i.e., k = logP (Q)). The discrete logarithm problem is
an intractable problem if the parameters are carefully chosen. The most efficient
algorithm known to date for computing an elliptic curve discrete logarithm is the
Pollard–ρ algorithm [66].
The Pollard–ρ algorithm requires an average of O(
√
n), where n is the number
of points on the elliptic curve, to compute an elliptic curve discrete logarithm even
with its parallelized version given by Gallant et. al. [67]. Hence, the security of
elliptic curve cryptosystems is based on the intractability of ECDLP.
It is important to realize that well-chosen curves achieve the required degree
of security. Other curves may exhibit structures that facilitate cryptanalysis, e.g.,
curves defined over composite fields of characteristic two [50].
2.7 Summary
In this chapter a brief introduction to GF (2m) finite field arithmetic has been pro-
vided. Elements in GF (2m) are mainly represented using (1) normal basis, or (2)
polynomial basis. Normal basis is chosen for the implementations described in this
dissertation since field operations in normal basis mainly consist of rotation, shifting
and exclusive-ORing which can be efficiently implemented in hardware.
Elliptic curve point operations have also been defined including (1) point addi-
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tion, and (2) point doubling. The addition of k copies of a point P is called scalar
multiplication and is denoted as kP . Scalar multiplication is the basic operation
in ECC encryption/decryption process and therefore efficient scalar multiplication
algorithms are highly required.
Several projective coordinate systems have been proposed to reduce the number
of inversions in scalar multiplication to only one single inversion. Lopez-Dahab pro-
jective coordinate system requires less number of field multiplications as compared
to other existing projective coordinate systems. Accordingly, Lopez-Dahab projec-
tive coordinate system has been selected for the the implementations presented in
this dissertation.
Being the core of elliptic curve cryptosystems security, the intractability of the
elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem has been also discussed in this chapter.
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Chapter 3
Scalar Multiplication Algorithms
Most scalar multiplication algorithms are variants of similar algorithms employed for
exponentiation. This chapter describes some of the most popular scalar multiplica-
tion algorithms [3,17,65,68–71]. These algorithms can be categorized into two main
categories: (1) fixed space-time algorithms, and (2) flexible space-time algorithms.
3.1 Fixed Space-Time Scalar Multiplication Al-
gorithms
This category contains scalar multiplication algorithms that require fixed number of
point additions and doubles. These algorithms also require fixed space complexity
in terms of required storage number of points.
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3.1.1 Double-and-Add Scalar Multiplication Algorithm
The double-and-add scalar multiplication algorithm, so called the binary algorithm,
is the easiest straightforward scalar multiplication algorithm. It inspects the bits
of the scalar multiplier k, if the inspected bit ki = 0, only point doubling is per-
formed. If, however, the inspected bit ki = 1, both point doubling and addition
are performed. Algorithms 3.1 and 3.2 show the most-to-least and the least-to-most
versions of the double-and-add scalar multiplication algorithm respectively.
In Algorithm 3.1, point doubling is always performed in Step 2.1, while point
addition is performed in Step 2.2 only if ki = 1. Similarly, in Algorithm 3.2, point
addition is performed in Step 2.1 only if ki = 1, while point doubling is always
performed in Step 2.2.
The double-and-add scalar multiplication algorithm requires, m point doubles
and an average of m
2
point additions. This algorithm also requires the storage of
two points, P and Q.
Algorithm 3.1 Double-and-add scalar multiplication algorithm (most-to-least).
Inputs: P, k
Output: kP
Initialization:
1. Q = P
Scalar Multiplication:
2. for i = m− 2 down to 0 do
2.1. Q = 2Q
2.2. if ki = 1 then Q = Q+ P
end for
3. return(Q)
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Algorithm 3.2 Double-and-add scalar multiplication algorithm (least-to-most).
Inputs: P, k
Output: kP
Initialization:
1. Q = O, R = P
Scalar Multiplication:
2. for i = 0 to m− 1 do
2.1. if ki = 1 then Q = Q+R
2.2. R = 2R
end for
3. return(Q)
3.1.2 Addition-Subtraction Scalar Multiplication Algorithm
Instead of performing only point doubles and additions as in the double-and-add
algorithm, the addition-subtraction scalar multiplication algorithm uses point sub-
tractions in addition to point doubles and additions operations (Algorithm 3.3).
Non-Adjacent Form (NAF) representation described in [71] is used in Algorithm
3.3. Using NAF representation, a multiplier k =
∑m−1
i=0 ki2
i is uniquely recoded as
k =
∑m
i=0 k
′
i2
i with k′i ∈ [−1, 1], where the recoded representation does not contain
contiguous nonzero digits. The NAF representation of an m-bit scalar multiplier k
is at most (m+ 1) digits long and its average number of nonzero digits is m
3
. Thus,
the addition-subtraction algorithm requires m point doubles and an average of m
3
point additions.
Algorithm 3.3 shows the most-to-least version of the addition-subtraction algo-
rithm. In Algorithm 3.3, the NAF recoding step is performed in Steps 1-1.4. Scalar
multiplications of Algorithm 3.3 actually starts in Step 2. The number of iterations
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performed by Algorithm 3.3 is (m+ 1) iterations. In Algorithm 3.3, point doubling
of the accumulated point is always performed in Step 2.1, while point addition is
performed in Step 2.2.1 only if the value of recoded digit k′i = 1. While point
subtraction is performed in Step 2.3.1 only if k′i = −1.
The addition-subtraction algorithm requires only the storage of two points, P
and Q.
Algorithm 3.3 Addition-subtraction scalar multiplication algorithm.
Inputs: P, k
Output: kP
Initialization:
Q = O
Recoding of k : k =
∑m
i=0 k
′
i2
i, k′i ∈ [−1, 1]
1. for i = 0 to m do
1.1. if k mod 2=1 then
1.1.1 k′i = 2− (k mod 22)
1.2. else
1.2.1 k′i = 0
1.3 k = k − k′i
1.4 k = k/2
end for
Scalar Multiplication:
2. for i = m down to 0 do
2.1. Q = 2Q
2.2. if k′i = 1 then
2.2.1. Q = Q+ P
2.3. if k′i = −1 then
2.3.1. Q = Q− P
end for
3. return(Q)
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3.1.3 Montgomery Scalar Multiplication Algorithm
The Montgomery algorithm [72] is based on the observation that the x-coordinate of
the sum of two points P1 and P2, whose difference is known to be P (P2−P1 = P ),
can be computed using the x-coordinates of the points P, P1, and P2. Consequently,
the y-coordinate of the point P1 can be recovered using the x-coordinates of P, P1,
and P2 together with the y-coordinate of P . This requires two inversions in each
iteration if affine coordinate system is used as illustrated in Algorithm 3.4.
Algorithm 3.4 Montgomery Scalar Multiplication Algorithm.
Inputs: P = (x, y), k
Output: kP
Initialization:
1. x1 = x, x2 = x
2 + b
x2
.
Scalar Multiplication:
2. for i = m− 2 down to 0 do
2.1. t = x1
x1+x2
2.2. if ki = 1 then
2.2.1 x1 = x+ t
2 + t, x2 = x
2
2 +
b
x22
2.3. else
2.3.1 x1 = x
2
1 +
b
x21
, x2 = x+ t
2 + t
end for
3. r1 = x1 + x, r2 = x2 + x.
4. y1 =
r1(r1r2+x2+y)
x+y
5. return((x1, y1).)
Alternatively, Lopez and Dahab [16] used projective coordinate to reduce the
number of inversions to only one single inversion at the end. More details on the
improved Montgomery algorithm is explained in [16].
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3.2 Flexible Space-Time Scalar Multiplication Al-
gorithms
This category contains flexible scalar multiplication algorithms that can be cus-
tomized according to the user need in terms of space and time complexities.
3.2.1 w-ary Scalar Multiplication Algorithm
The double-and-add algorithm is a special case of the w -ary scalar multiplication
algorithm. The w -ary algorithm processes w bits of the scalar multiplier k in each
iteration instead of only a single bit as in the double-and-add algorithm. The w -
ary algorithm requires recoding the scalar multiplier and precomputing some points
before starting scalar multiplication.
Algorithm 3.5 shows the most-to-least version of the w -ary algorithm. Steps
1-1.3 show the process of recoding the multiplier k using radix digits. The recoded
scalar multiplier has dm
w
e with each digit in the range [0, 2w): k = ∑dmw e−1i=0 k′i2wi.
The points iP for i ∈ [2, 2w) are precomputed (Steps 2-2.2), and stored to be used
later as needed. The precomputed points require approximately 2w−1 point doubles
and 2w−1 point additions.
The scalar multiplication process starts at Step 3. The number of iterations
performed is dm
w
e. In Algorithm 3.5, w point doubles are always performed in Step
3.1, while point addition of is performed in Step 3.2 only if k′i 6= 0.
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The scalar multiplication phase requires m point doubles and approximately an
average of m
w
point additions. The algorithm also requires the storage of approxi-
mately 2w points.
Algorithm 3.5 w -ary scalar multiplication algorithm.
Inputs: P, k
Output: kP
Initialization:
Q = O, P1 = P
Recoding of k : k =
∑dm
w
e−1
i=0 k
′
i2
wi, k′i ∈ [0, 2w)
1. for i = 0 to dm
w
e − 1 do
1.1. k′i = k mod 2
w
1.2. k = k − k′i
1.3. k = k/2w
end for
Precomputations: Pi = iP, i ∈ [0, 2w)
2. for i = 1 to 2w−1 − 1 do
2.1. P2i = 2Pi
2.2. P2i+1 = P2i + P
end for
Scalar Multiplication:
3. for i = dm
w
e − 1 down to 0 do
3.1. Q = 2wQ
3.2. if k′i 6= 0 then
3.2.1. Q = Q+ Pk′i
end for
4. return(Q)
3.2.2 w-ary Addition-subtraction Scalar Multiplication Al-
gorithm
The addition-subtraction algorithm is a special case of the w -ary addition-subtraction
scalar multiplication algorithm. The w -ary addition-subtraction algorithm processes
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w bits of the scalar multiplier k in each iteration instead of only a single bit as in the
addition-subtraction algorithm. The w -ary algorithm requires recoding of the scalar
multiplier and precomputing of some points before starting the scalar multiplication
process.
Algorithm 3.6 w -ary addition-subtraction scalar multiplication algorithm.
Inputs: P, k
Output: kP
Initialization:
Q = O, P1 = P
Recoding of k : k =
∑dm+1
w
e−1
i=0 k
′
i2
wi, k′i ∈ [−2w−1, 2w−1)
1. for i = 0 to dm+1
w
e − 1 do
1.1. k′i = k mod 2
w
1.2. if k′i ≥ 2w−1 then
1.2.1 k′i = −(2w − k′i)
1.3. k = k − k′i
1.4. k = k/2w
end for
Precomputations: Pi = iP, i ∈ [1, 2w−1]
2. for i = 1 to 2w−2 − 1 do
2.1. P2i = 2Pi
2.2. P2i+1 = P2i + P
end for
3. P2w−1 = 2P2w−2
Scalar Multiplication:
4. for i = dm+1
w
e − 1 down to 0 do
4.1. Q = 2wQ
4.2. if k′i > 0 then
4.2.1. Q = Q+ Pki
4.3. if k′i < 0 then
4.3.1. Q = Q− P|ki|
end for
5. return(Q)
Algorithm 3.6 shows the most-to-least version of the w -ary addition-subtraction
algorithm. Steps 1-1.4 show the recoding of the multiplier k in radix 2w with dm+1
w
e
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digits in the range [−2w−1, 2w−1): k∑dm+1w e−1i=0 k′i2wi. Precomputations are performed
in Steps 2-3. The precomputed points are of the values iP for i ∈ [2, 2w−1] and
require approximately 2w−2 point doubles and 2w−2 point additions.
Scalar multiplications of Algorithm 3.6 actually starts in Step 4. The number
of iterations performed by Algorithm 3.6 is dm+1
w
e − 1 iterations. In Algorithm 3.6,
w point doubles of the accumulated point are always performed in Step 4.1, while
point addition of the point P|k′i| and the accumulated point is performed in Step
4.2.1 only if k′i > 0. If k
′
i < 0, the point P|k′i| is subtracted from the accumulated
point in Step 4.3.1.
The w -ary algorithm requires in scalar multiplication phase m point doubles
and an average of m
w
point additions. The algorithm also requires the storage of
approximately 2w−1 points.
3.2.3 Width-w Addition-Subtraction Scalar Multiplication
Algorithm
The width-w addition-subtraction scalar multiplication algorithm is an extension of
the addition-subtraction algorithm. It uses w -NAF recoding to recode the scalar
multiplier k as follows: k =
∑l
i=0 k
′
i2
i where k′i ∈ (−2w−1, 2w−1) and k′i is odd. The
width-w addition-subtraction algorithm requires also precomputation in addition to
recoding before performing scalar multiplication.
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Algorithm 3.7 Width-w Addition-Subtraction Scalar Multiplication Algorithm.
Inputs: P, k
Output: kP
Initialization:
Q = O
Recoding of k : k =
∑m
i=0 k
′
i2
i, k′i ∈ (−2w−1, 2w−1)
1. for i = 0 to m do
1.1. if k mod 2 =1 then
1.1.1. k′i = k mod 2
w
1.1.2. if k′i ≥ 2w−1 then
1.1.2.1 k′i = −(2w − k′i)
1.2. else
1.2.1. k′i = 0
1.3. k = k − k′i
1.4. k = k/2
end for
Precomputations:
2. P0 = P
3. T = 2P
4. for i = 1 to 2w−2 − 1 do
4.1 Pi = Pi−1 + T
end for
Scalar Multiplication:
5. for i = m down to 0 do
5.1. Q = 2Q
5.2. if k′i > 0 then
5.2.1. Q = Q+ Pbk′i/2c
5.3. if k′i < 0 then
5.3.1. Q = Q− Pb|k′i|/2c
end for
6. return(Q)
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Algorithm 3.7 shows the most-to-least version of the width-w addition-subtraction
algorithm. In Algorithm 3.7, the w -NAF recoding step is performed in Steps 1-1.4.
Precomputation of the points iP for odd values of i in the range [3, 2w−1) are com-
puted in Steps 2-4.1. The precomputation phase of Algorithm 3.7 requires one point
double and 2w−2 − 1 point additions.
Scalar multiplications of Algorithm 3.7 actually starts in Step 5. The number of
iterations performed by Algorithm 3.7 is m + 1 iterations. In Algorithm 3.7, point
doubling of the accumulated point is always performed in Step 5.1. Point addition
is performed between the accumulated point and the point Pbk′i/2c in Step 5.2.1 only
if the value of recoded digit k′i > 0. While the point Pb|k′i|/2c is subtracted from the
accumulated point in Step 5.3.1 only if k′i < 0. Scalar multiplications require m
point doubles and on the average m
w+1
point additions/subtractions. The algorithm
also requires the storage of approximately 2w−2 points.
3.2.4 Signed BGMW Scalar Multiplication Algorithm
The signed BGMW scalar multiplication algorithm is based on the BGMW scalar
multiplication algorithm [73]. It recodes the scalar multiplier k using signed digit
representation as: k =
∑dm+1
w
e−1
i=0 k
′
i2
wi with k′i ∈ (−2w−1, 2w−1).
Algorithm 3.8 shows the signed BGMW scalar multiplication algorithm. In
Algorithm 3.8, recoding of the scalar multiplier k is performed in Steps 1-1.4.
The precomputation steps (Steps 2-3.1), require precomputing the points 2wiP for
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Algorithm 3.8 Signed BGMW Scalar Multiplication Algorithm.
Inputs: P, k
Output: kP
Initialization:
A = O, B = O
Recoding of k : k =
∑dm+1
w
e−1
i=0 k
′
i2
wi, k′i ∈ [−2w−1, 2w−1)
1. for i = 0 to dm+1
w
e − 1 do
1.1. k′i = k mod 2
w
1.2. if k′i ≥ 2w−1 then
1.2.1 k′i = −(2w − k′i)
1.3. k = k − k′i
1.4. k = k/2w
end for
Precomputation: Pi = 2
wiP, ∀i = 0, 1, ..., (dm+1
w
e − 1)
2. P0 = P
3. for i = 1 to dm+1
w
e − 1 do
3.1. Pi = 2
wiPi−1
end for
Scalar Multiplication:
4. for j = 2w−1 down to 1 do
4.1. for each i for which k′i = j do
4.1.1 B = B + Pi
4.2. for each i for which k′i = −j do
4.2.1 B = B − Pi
4.3. A = A+B
5. return(A)
34
i = 1, 2, ...(dm+1
w
e − 1).
In the scalar multiplication phase, point addition or subtraction is performed
between the accumulated point and the point 2wiP depending on the value of k′i.
From the iteration at which the point 2wiP is added or subtracted till the last
loop iteration, the accumulated point is added to itself k′i times; therefore, the
accumulated point incorporates the point k′i(2
wiP ) in its result (Steps 4-4.3).
In Algorithm 3.8, scalar multiplication requires 2w−1+m
w
point additions/subtractions
and no point doubling is required. The algorithm also requires the storage of dm
w
e
points.
3.2.5 Lim-Lee Scalar Multiplication Algorithm
The Lim-Lee scalar multiplication algorithm, so called the comb scalar multiplication
algorithm, is proposed by Lim and Lee in [74]. Algorithm 3.9 shows the most-to-least
version of the Lim-Lee scalar multiplication algorithm.
In this algorithm, the scalar multiplier k is arranged into h blocks, each of length
a = dm
h
e. Furthermore, each block is subdivided into v blocks of size b = da
v
e. Thus,
the scalar multiplier k can be written as:
k =
h−1∑
r=0
v−1∑
s=0
b−1∑
t=0
kvbr+bs+t2
vbr+bs+t
The scalar multiplication expression is given as:
kP =
b−1∑
t=0
2t(
v−1∑
s=0
G[s][Is,t])
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Algorithm 3.9 Lim-Lee Scalar Multiplication Algorithm.
Inputs:
P, k
h - number of blocks of k = the number of rows in the precomputation array
a - length of the blocks
v - number of sub-blocks to which each block is divided
b - size of each sub-block
Output: kP
Initialization:
Q = O
Precomputation:
1. for i = 0 to h− 1 do
1.1. Pi = 2
aiP
end for
Precomputation array:
2. for u = 1 to 2h − 1 do
2.1. G[0][u] =
∑h−1
s=0 usPs, where u =
∑h−1
s=0 us2
s, us ∈ [0, 1]
2.2. for s = 1 to v − 1 do
2.2.1. G[s][u] = 2sbG[0][u]
end for
end for
Scalar Multiplication:
3. for t = b− 1 down to 0 do
3.1. Q = 2Q
3.2. for s = v − 1 down to 0 do
3.2.1 Is,t =
∑h−1
t=0 kat+bs+t2
i
3.2.2 if Is,t 6= 0 then
3.2.2.1. Q = Q+G[s][Is,t]
end for
end for
4. return(Q)
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where the precomputation array G[s][u] for 0 ≤ s < v, 0 ≤ u < 2h, and u =
(uh−1...u0)2, is defined by the following equations:
G[0][u] =
h−1∑
r=0
ur2
rvbP ,
G[s][u] = 2sbG[0][u],
and the number Is,t, for 0 ≤ s < v − 1 and 0 ≤ t < b is defined by:
Is,t =
h−1∑
r=0
kvbr+bs+t2
r,
Algorithm 3.9 requires b− 1 point doubles and an average of a point additions.
This algorithm also requires the storage of v(2h−1) points. More details on Lim-Lee
algorithm is explained in [74].
Table 3.1 summarizes the average time complexity and storage requirement of
scalar multiplication algorithms. The average time complexity is specified in terms
of point additions and point doubles without including precomputations which can
be performed off-line. While the storage requirements are specified in terms of the
number of points that needs to be stored.
3.3 Summary
In this chapter, scalar multiplication algorithms have been surveyed. These algo-
rithms can be categorized into two main categories: (1) fixed space-time algorithms,
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Table 3.1: Complexity of scalar multiplication algorithms
Algorithm # doubles # additions # Stored points
double-and-add m m
2
2
addition-subtraction m m
3
2
w -ary m m
w
2w
w -ary addition-subtraction m m
w
2w−1
width-w m m
w+1
2w−2
addition-subtraction
Signed BGMW 0 2w−1 + m
w
m
w
Lim-Lee b− 1 a v(2h − 1)
(m = ah, a = vb)
and (2) flexible space-time algorithms. Most of these algorithms use scalar mul-
tiplier recoding and precomputed points to speedup the required time for scalar
multiplication.
The fixed space-time algorithms category contains scalar multiplication algo-
rithms that require fixed number of point additions and doubles. These algorithms
also require fixed storage requirements. These include (1) the double-and-add algo-
rithm, (2) the addition-subtraction algorithm, and (3) the Montgomery algorithm.
The flexible space-time algorithms category, on the other hand, contains flexible
scalar multiplication algorithms that can be customized according to user needs in
terms of space and time. These include (1) the w -ary algorithm, (2) the w -ary
addition-subtraction algorithm, (3) the width-w addition-subtraction algorithm, (4)
the Signed BGMW algorithm, and (5) the Lim-Lee algorithm.
For the implementations presented in this dissertation, the double-and-add al-
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gorithm is selected for one implementation and new algorithms are proposed for
the other implementations which use scalar multiplier recoding and precomputed
points.
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Chapter 4
Normal Basis GF (2m) Field
Arithmetic
Efficient computations in finite fields and their architectures are important in many
applications, including coding theory, and public-key cryptosystems (e.g., elliptic
curve cryptosystems (ECC) [1]). Although all finite fields of the same cardinality are
isomorphic, their arithmetic efficiency depends greatly on the choice of the basis used
for field element representation. The most commonly used bases are the polynomial
basis (PB) and the normal basis (NB)[60][75]. The normal basis [57] is more suitable
for hardware implementations than the polynomial basis since operations in normal
basis representation are mainly comprised of rotation, shifting and exclusive-ORing
which can be efficiently implemented in hardware. This chapter surveys GF (2m)
field multiplication and inversion algorithms. A more detailed survey with examples
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is found in our work in [76].
4.1 Multiplication
In finite field arithmetic, multiplication is a more complex operation than addition
and squaring. An efficient multiplier is the key for efficient finite field computations.
Finite filed multipliers using normal basis can be classified into two main categories:
(1) λ-matrix based multipliers and (2) Conversion based multipliers.
4.1.1 λ-Matrix Based Multipliers
Massey and Omura [77] proposed an efficient normal basis bit-serial multiplier over
GF (2m). The Massey-Omura multiplier requires only twom-bit cyclic shift registers
and combinational logic. The combinational logic consists of a set of AND and
XOR logic gates (see Figure 4.1). The first implementation of the Massey-Omura
multiplier was reported by Wang. et. al. [78]. The space complexity of the Massey-
Omura multiplier is (2m − 1) AND gates + (2m − 2) XOR gates, while the time
complexity is TA + (1 + log2(m − 1))TX , where TA and TX are the delay of one
AND gate and one XOR gate respectively. One advantage of the Massey-Omura
multiplier is that it can be used with both types of the optimal normal basis (Type
I and Type II). The bit-parallel version of the Massey-Omura multiplier requires
(2m2 −m) AND gates + (2m2 − 2m) XOR gates.
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Figure 4.1: GF (25) bit-serial Massey-Omura multiplier [77].
Hasan et. al. [79] proposed a modified version of the Massey-Omura parallel
multiplier which works only with ONB Type I. The basic idea is to decompose the
λm−1 matrix as a sum of two matrices P and Q.
λ(m−1) = P +Q (mod 2)
where the (i, j) entry of P is defined as follows:
pi, j =

1, if i = (m
2
+ j);
0 otherwise.
The product cm−1−k can be obtained as:
cm−1−k = A λ(k) Bt = A P Bt + A(k) Q B(k)t , cˆ+ cˆm−1−k (mod 2)
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where A(k) and B(k) are the k-cyclic shifted vectors of A and B. Hasan et.
al. noticed that cˆ is independent of k and is present in each cm−1−k. Hence, it
can be precomputed once at the beginning thus reducing the multiplier’s hardware
complexity. Compared to the Massey-Omura parallel multiplier, this multiplier
requires only (m2 − 1) XOR gates and the same number of AND gates. However,
the time complexity of this modified parallel multiplier is the same as the Massey-
Omura parallel multiplier and the number of XOR gates is still O(m2).
Alternatively, Gao and Sobelman in [80] noticed that the Massey-Omura bit-
serial multiplier is constructed using an AND plane and an XOR plane. Gao and
Sobelman suggested to rearrange these planes into three planes: XOR-plane, AND-
plane and another XOR-plane as shown in Figure 4.2. This is achieved by rearrang-
ing the multiplication equation as:
ck =
m−1∑
i=0
m−1∑
j=0
aiλ
(k)
ij bj =
m−1∑
i=0
ai[
m−1∑
j=0
λ
(k)
ij bj]
The Gao and Sobelman multiplier [80] requires the same number of XOR gates
and has the same time complexity as the Massey-Omura multiplier. The only im-
provement was reducing the number of AND gates to only m2 AND gate compared
to (2m2 −m) AND gates for the Massey-Omura multiplier.
Reyhani-Masoleh and Hasan [81] presented another multiplier based on the same
idea of rearranging the multiplier’s XOR and AND planes as in [80] but with a
different formulation. The product terms are reformulated as:
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Figure 4.2: Gao and Sobelman multiplier [80].
ck = akbk +
∑
(r, s)∈Φk
(ar + as)(br + bs), 0 ≤ k ≤ m− 1.
where Φk contains the coordinates of 1’s in the upper part of the λk matrix. The
space complexity is (m2) AND + (3m2− 3m) XOR gates while the time complexity
is TA + dlog2(2m − 1)eTX . This means that the Gao and Sobelman [80] multiplier
is more efficient than Reyhani-Masoleh and Hasan multiplier [81].
Reyhani-Masoleh and Hasan have also reported [82] a parallel multiplier that
takes advantage of the symmetry of the λ matrix and reduced redundancy in the λ
matrix. This is achieved by rewriting the λ matrix as λ = U + UT +D, where D is
the diagonal matrix and U is the upper triangular matrix having zeros at diagonal
entries. Thus, the multiplication product can be written as follows:
C = A× U ×BT +B × U × AT + A×D ×BT
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Table 4.1: The λ-based multipliers and their space and time complexities.
Multiplier Space Complexity Time Complexity Type
of ONB
Massey and Omura [77] (2m2 −m) AND TA + (1 + log2(m− 1))TX I & II
+ (2m2 − 2m) XOR
Hasan et. al. [79] (2m2 −m) AND TA + (1 + log2(m− 1))TX I
+ (m2 − 1) XOR
Gao and Sobelman [80] (m2) AND TA + (1 + log2(m− 1))TX I & II
+ (2m2 − 2m) XOR
Reyhani-Masoleh (m2) AND TA + dlog2(2m− 1)eTX I & II
and Hasan [81] + (3m2 − 3m) XOR
Reyhani-Masoleh (m2) AND TA + (1 + log2(m− 1))TX I & II
and Hasan [82] + (m2 − 1) XOR
The U matrix is reformulated according to the value of m (even or odd). How-
ever, the proposed multiplier’s space complexity is (m2) AND + (m2−1) XOR, and
the time complexity is TA + (1 + log2(m − 1))TX which represents minor gain as
compared to other multipliers.
Table 4.1 compares the λ-based multipliers space and time complexities. The
space complexity is specified by the number of AND and XOR gates. While the
time complexity is specified by time required by the critical path to produce the
results.
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4.1.2 Conversion Based Multipliers
Koc and Sunar in [83] proposed a new bit-parallel multiplier over GF (2m). The
multiplier was employed to perform Type I optimal normal basis multiplication by
converting the two operands into canonical basis 1. After multiplication, the result is
converted back to the normal basis. The proposed technique yields a slight improve-
ment in the number of XOR gates as compared to the Massey-Omura multiplier. The
number of required XOR gates is reduced down to (m2−1) as compared to (2m2−m)
for the Massey-Omura multiplier, while its time complexity TA+(2+ log2(m−1))TX
is slightly more than Massey-Omura’s time complexity. The main advantage of this
technique, however, is the opening of a new direction in multiplications based on
basis conversion which was first explored by Sunar and Koc in [84].
Sunar and Koc in [84] reported a new Type II optimal normal basis multiplier.
The main idea of their work is based on converting the two operands to equivalent
representations in another basis, perform the multiplication in that basis and convert
the product back to the normal basis. The conversion step requires only a single
clock cycle since it is nothing but a permutation of the normal basis.
Using optimal normal basis Type II and assuming that p (= 2m + 1) is prime,
another new basis which is obtained by simple permutation of the normal basis
elements was presented. Let β be γ+γ−1, where γ is the primitive pth root of unity,
1A basis of the form (αm−1, ..., α2, α1, 1), where α ∈ GF (2m) is a root of the generating poly-
nomial of degree m, is called a canonical basis.
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the new basis can be written in the form γ + γ−1, γ2 + γ−2, γ3 + γ−3, ..., γm + γ−m.
Two elements Aˆ and Bˆ ∈ GF (2m) can be represented in the new basis as:
Aˆ =
m∑
i=1
aˆi(γ
i + γ−i) =
m∑
i=1
aˆiβi, and
Bˆ =
m∑
i=1
bˆi(γ
i + γ−i) =
m∑
i=1
bˆiβi
The product Cˆ = Aˆ · Bˆ is written as:
Cˆ = (
m∑
i=1
aˆi(γ
i + γ−i))(
m∑
j=1
bˆj(γ
j + γ−j))
This product can transformed to the following form:
Cˆ =
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
aˆibˆj(γ
i−j + γ−(i−j)) +
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
aˆibˆj(γ
i+j + γ−(i+j))
= Cˆ1 + Cˆ2
The term Cˆ1 has the property that the exponent (i − j) of γ is already within the
proper range, i.e., −m ≤ (i − j) ≤ m for all i, j ∈ [1, m]. The term Cˆ2 should be
ensured to be in the proper range. Hence, Cˆ2 is computed as follows:
Cˆ2 =
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
aˆibˆj(γ
i+j + γ−(i+j))
=
m∑
i=1
m−i∑
j=1
aˆibˆj(γ
i+j + γ−(i+j)) +
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=m−i+1
aˆibˆj(γ
i+j + γ−(i+j))
= Dˆ1 + Dˆ2
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The exponents of the basis elements γi+j+γ−(i+j) in Dˆ1 are guaranteed to be in the
proper range 1 ≤ (i+ j) ≤ m for i = 1, 2, ...,m and j = 1, 2, ...,m− i. If k = i+ j,
then product aˆibˆj contributes to the basis element βk as i and j take these values.
The basis elements of Dˆ2, however, are all out of range. Thus, the identity γ
2m+1 is
used to bring them to the proper range as:
Dˆ2 =
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=m−i+1
aˆibˆj(γ
i+j + γ−(i+j))
=
m∑
i=1
m−i∑
j=m−i+1
aˆibˆj(γ
2m+1−(i+j) + γ−(2m+1−(i+j)))
Therefore, if k = i + j > m, βk is replaced by β2m+1−k and thus the final product
can be found as:
Cˆ = Cˆ1 + Dˆ1 + Dˆ2
The hardware complexity of this bit-parallel multiplier ism2 AND gates+ 3
2
(m2−
m) XOR gates and the time complexity is TA+(1+dlog2me)TX . This represents an
improvement of about 25 percent less XOR gates compared to the Massey-Omura
multiplier but with slightly more delay. A major advantage of this method, however,
is the fact that there is no need to store the λ matrix to perform multiplications
which requires m3 locations if all λ matrices are stored or m2 if only λ(0) is stored.
This is a major advantage in area constrained environments since we only need to
store the permutation array which requires only m log2(m) storage locations.
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Alternatively, Wu et. al. in [85] extended the work described in [86] and pre-
sented a new Type II multiplier. The basic idea is the same as that of Sunar and
Hasan [84]. Multiplication is performed by converting the two operands into another
basis which is simply a permutation of the normal basis, perform the multiplication
and convert the product back to the original normal basis. The difference is only in
the multiplication part. The product can be found in the new basis as:
cˆj =
m∑
i=1
aˆi(bˆs(j+i) + bˆs(j−i)), j = 1, 2, ..., m.
where s(i) is defined as:
s(i) =

i mod 2m+ 1, if 0 ≤ i mod 2m+ 1 ≤ m;
2m+ 1− i mod 2m+ 1, otherwise.
The hardware complexity of this multiplier is m2 AND gates + (2m2−m) XOR
gates which is worse than the Sunar and Koc multiplier [84] as shown in Figure 4.3.
However, the time complexity is TA + (1 + dlog2me)TX which is the same as the
Sunar and Koc multiplier [84].
Table 4.2 summarizes the conversion based multipliers and their space and time
complexities. It is clear from Table 4.2 that Sunar and Koc multiplier provides the
best space and time complexities.
49
Figure 4.3: The Wu et. al. multiplier [85].
Table 4.2: The conversion based multipliers and their space and time complexities.
Multiplier Space Complexity Time Complexity Type
of ONB
Koc and Sunar [83] (2m2 −m) AND TA + (2 + log2(m− 1))TX I
+ (m2 − 1) XOR
Sunar and Koc [84] m2 AND TA + (1 + dlog2me)TX II
+ 3
2
(m2 −m) XOR
Wu et. al. [85] m2 AND TA + (1 + dlog2me)TX II
+ (2m2 −m) XOR
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4.2 Inversion
Inversion using normal basis consists of multiplications and cyclic shifts. Since cyclic
shifts require almost negligible time, the number of multiplications is the key param-
eter for efficient inversion. In the following subsections we survey existing algorithms
for inversion over GF (2m) using normal basis. These inversion algorithms can be
classified into three main categories: (1) Standard, (2) Exponent Decomposing and
(3) Exponent Grouping inversion algorithms.
4.2.1 Standard Inversion Algorithm
This category contains only one algorithm, which is the first proposed normal basis
inversion algorithm overGF (2m) by Wang et. al. [78]. The basic idea is derived from
Fermat’s Little Theorem where the inverse of a ∈ GF (2m) is given by a−1 = a2m−2.
Since 2m − 2 =
m−1∑
i=1
2i, we can express a−1 as:
a−1 = (a2).(a2
2
)...(a2
m−1) = a2
m−2
Algorithm 4.1 Wang’s et. al. inversion algorithm.
Inputs: a
Output: a−1
1. B = a2, C = 1 and k = 0
2. D = B × C and k = k + 1
3. if k = m− 1, a−1 = D Stop
4. if k < m− 1, B = B2 and C = D
5. Go back to 2
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This only requires multiplication and cyclic shift operations. The algorithm
procedure for computing a−1 as suggested by Wang et. al. [78] is shown in Algo-
rithm 4.1. It requires (m−2) multiplications + (m−1) cyclic shifts. The advantage
of this method is its simplicity while its disadvantage is the large O(m) number of
multiplications.
4.2.2 Exponent Decomposing Inversion Algorithms
Since the number of multiplications is the dominant factor in determining the com-
putation time of the inversion operation, several algorithms attempted to improve
the inversion speed by decomposing the exponent to reduce the required number
of multiplications and replace it with squaring operations which are much simpler
compared to multiplication.
In 1988 Itoh and Tsujii proposed a GF (2m) inversion algorithm derived from Fer-
mat’s Little Theorem using normal basis [87]. The basic idea used was to decompose
the exponent m− 1 as follows:
a−1 = a2
m−2 = (a2
m−1−1)2
The exponent 2m−1 − 1 is further decomposed as follows:
1. If m is odd, then
(2m−1 − 1) = (2m−12 − 1)(2m−12 + 1), and
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a2
m−1
= (a2
m−1
2 −1)2
m−1
2 +1
2. If m is even, then
2m−1 − 1 = 2(2m−2 − 1) + 1 = 2(2m−22 − 1)(2m−22 + 1) + 1, and
a2
m−1
= a2(2
m−2
2 −1)(2m−22 +1)+1
The proposed algorithm by Itoh and Tsujii [87] is shown in Algorithm 4.2 and
it requires log2(m− 1) + v(m− 1)− 1 multiplications, where v(x) is the number of
1’s in the binary representation of x.
Algorithm 4.2 Itoh-Tsujii inversion algorithm.
Inputs: a
Output: l = a−1
1. set s← blog2(m− 1)c − 1
2. set p← a
3. for i = s down to 0 do
3.1. set r ← shift m− 1 to right by s bit(s)
3.2. set q ← p
3.3. rotate q to left by br/2c bit(s)
3.4. set t← p× q
3.5. if least bit of r = 1
3.5.1 rotate t to left by 1 bit
3.5.2 p← t× a
3.5. else
3.5.3 p← t
3.6. s← s− 1
4. rotate p to left by 1 bit
5. set l← p
6. return l
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Feng [88] has also proposed an inversion algorithm which requires the same
time complexity as the Itoh and Tsujii inversion algorithm, i.e. O(log2(m)). The
inversion algorithm was also derived from Fermat’s Little Theorem and is also based
on exponent decomposition as the Itoh and Tsujii inversion algorithm [87]. Feng
defined m− 1 as follows:
Let mqmq−1m1m0 be the binary representation of (m − 1), where mq = 1 and
mi is 0 or 1 for i = 0 to q− 1, i.e. m− 1 = mq2q +mq−12q−1+ +m121+m020. The
inverse a−1 can be computed using Algorithm 4.3.
Algorithm 4.3 Feng’s inversion algorithm.
Inputs: a
Output: a−1
1. b = a
2. for i = q to 1 do
2.1. if mi = 1, then b = b
2−2
i
2.2. b = b× b2−2i−1
2.3. if mi−1 = 1, then b = b× a
3. a−1 = (b)2
m−m0 , Stop
Only steps 2.2 and 2.3 in Algorithm 4.3 require multiplications. Step 2.1 and
3 need only cyclic shifts. Thus, the algorithm has (q + p) multiplications where
q = blog2(m)c and, p = #1s in the binary expression of (m − 1). Accordingly,
the proposed algorithm has the same complexity as the Itoh and Tsujii inversion
algorithm [87]. The difference is only that the Itoh and Tsujii algorithm performs
squaring during each iteration, while Feng’s algorithm computes the square roots
each iteration and squares at the end by 2m−m0 .
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Takagi et. al. in [89] proposed another inversion algorithm which was also based
on exponent decomposition. The main idea is as follows: Since
2m − 2 = 2m−1 + 2m−1 − 2 = 2m−1 + 2m−2..+ 2m−h + 2m−h − 2,
a−1 = a2
m−2 = a2
m−1
.a2
m−2
...a2
m−h+2m−h−2
Hence, the algorithm can use the inversion algorithm in [87] by replacing m by
(m − h). This method reduces the number of multiplications through performing
an exhaustive search for an optimal value of h. The time complexity, however, is
O(log2(m)).
4.2.3 Exponent Grouping Inversion Algorithms
Grouping exponent terms is another approach which attracted some researchers.
However, the resulting speed is O(m) which is worse than the O(log2(m)) of the
Itoh and Tsujii inverter [87]. The inversion algorithms in this category are based on
the idea of grouping exponent terms as follows:
Since a−1 = a2
m−2 = (a2).(a4)...(a2
m−1), this allows grouping exponent terms in
different ways. Fenn et. al. in [90] proposed an inversion algorithm which requires
m
2
multiplications. The basic idea was by dividing the exponent terms into two
equal groups. The first group contains a2, a4, .., ak, where k = 2
m−1
2 . The other
group contains the remaining terms till a2
m
. By multiplying the first term in each
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group and repeated squaring by 22
i
, the following formula can be applied to give
the inverse within m
2
multiplications.
a−1 =

m−1
2∏
i=1
[a · a2
m−1
2 ]2
i
m odd;
a2
m−1 ·
m−1
2∏
i=1
[a · a2
m−1
2 ]2
i
m even.
A further improvement, however, have been reported by Calvo and Torres [91].
The Calvo and Torres [91] inversion algorithm uses a fixed seed a2 · a4 = a6, which
uses the same idea of grouping into two groups but in a different manner. This can
be shown as:
a−1 =

m−3
2∏
i=0
[a6]2
2i
m odd;
a2
m−1 ·
m−4
2∏
i=0
[a6]2
2i
m even.
This method was generalized by choosing m′ and b such that m = bm′+r, where
r = [1, 2]. This is basically the same way trying to group more terms in the seed at
the beginning.
a−1 =

b−1∏
i=0
[a2
m′−1−2]2
m′i
m = am′ + 1 ;
a2
m−1 ·
b−1∏
i=0
[a2
m′−1−2]2
m′i
m = am′ + 2.
This requires around m
m′ multiplications but still with the same O(m) time com-
plexity.
Yen proposed another approach for grouping terms which results in reduced
number of clock cycles [92], . Yen realized that the fundamental idea behind Fenn’s
56
et. al. inverter is to rearrange all terms into m−1
2
groups and to extract the common
term (a.a2
m−1
2 ). Accordingly, Yen redefined the common term to contain p terms
and a−1 can be found as:
k=m−1
p∏
i=1
(X)2
i
where the common part X is precomputed as:
p−1∏
j=0
a2
j m−1p
The best case requires k + (p − 1) multiplications while the worst case requires
k + (p− 1) + (p− 2) = k + 2p− 3 multiplications and the optimal selection of p for
m = pk + 1 is
√
m . The time complexity, however, is still O(m).
Table 4.3 summarizes the inversion algorithms and their time complexities. It is
clear from Table 4.3 that exponent decomposition inversion algorithms provide the
best time complexity among other inversion classes which require O(m) multiplica-
tions.
4.3 Summary
In this chapter a brief survey of finite field arithmetic using normal basis over
GF (2m) has been presented. Addition in normal basis requires simple XOR opera-
tion while squaring requires only a cyclic shift. This is the most attractive property
of using normal basis as compared to using polynomial basis.
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Table 4.3: The inverters and their time complexities.
Inverter Class Time Complexity
(# of Multiplications)
Wang et. al. [78] Standard (m− 2) multiplications
Itoh and Tsujii [87] Exponent Decomposing log2(m− 1) + v(m− 1)− 1
Feng [88] Exponent Decomposing blog2(m)c+ p
Takagi et. al. [89] Exponent Decomposing log2(m)
Fenn et. al. [90] Exponent Grouping m
2
Calvo and Torres [91] Exponent Grouping m
2
Yen [92] Exponent Grouping m−1
p
+ (p− 1)
Normal basis multipliers are categorized in this dissertation into two main cat-
egories:(1) λ-matrix based multipliers, and (2) Conversion based multipliers. The
conversion based multipliers are more efficient since they don’t require storing the
λ-matrix. The comparisons show that the Type II Sunar-Koc multiplier is the best
multiplier with a hardware complexity of m2 AND gates + 3/2 m(m−1) XOR gates
and a time complexity of TA+(1+ dlog2me)TX . Accordingly, the Sunar-Koc multi-
plier has been selected for use in the cryptoprocessors proposed for implementations
in this dissertation.
Inversion algorithms, on the other hand, are categorized into three main cat-
egories: (1) Standard, (2) Exponent Decomposing, and (3) Exponent Grouping.
Exponent grouping inversion algorithms have better performance compared to the
standard with time complexity O(m). The exponent decomposing inversion algo-
rithm of Itoh and Tsujii, however, is found to be the best inverter requiring only
log2(m − 1) multiplications. Accordingly, the Itoh-Tsujii inverter has been chosen
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for the implementations presented in this dissertation.
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Chapter 5
Power Analysis Attacks and
GF (2m) FPGA Implementations
In this chapter we survey work on power analysis attacks. This chapter also surveys
existing elliptic curve cryptosystem implementations on FPGA over GF (2m) using
normal basis.
5.1 Power Analysis Attacks
Power analysis attacks are usually divided into two types. The first type, Simple
Power Analysis (SPA), is based on a single observation of power consumption, while
the second type, Differential Power Analysis (DPA) combines SPA attack with an
error-correcting technique using statistical analysis [11]. More importantly, classical
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DPA attacks have been extensively researched for each cryptosystem and new types
of DPA are continuously being developed. Many of the existing countermeasures
are vulnerable to the more recent attacks which include Refined Power Analysis
(RPA) [94], Zero Power Analysis (ZPA) [95], Doubling Attack [96] and Address-Bit
Differential Power Analysis (ADPA) [102]. In the next subsections, these attacks
are described in more detail.
5.1.1 Simple Power Analysis
A SPA attack consists of observing the power consumption during a single execution
of a cryptographic algorithm. The power consumption analysis may also enable one
to distinguish between point addition and point doubling in the double-and-add
algorithm.
Coron [97] showed that for Algorithm 3.1 to be SPA resistant, the instructions
performed during a cryptographic algorithm should not depend on the data being
processed, e.g. there should not be any branch instructions conditioned by the data.
This could be done by performing the addition and doubling each time and then at
the end of the loop decide whether to accept the result or to eliminate the addition
part according to ki value (see Algorithm 5.1). However, even though this scheme
is resistant to a SPA attack, it remains vulnerable to a DPA attack.
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Algorithm 5.1 Double-and-add-always Scalar Multiplication Algorithm.
1. input P, k
2. Q[0]← P
3. for i from m− 2 to 0 do
3.1. Q[0]← 2Q[0]
3.2. Q[1]← Q[0] + P
3.3. Q[0]← Q[ki]
4. output Q[0]
5.1.2 Differential Power Analysis
A DPA attack is based on the same basic concept as a SPA attack, but uses error
correction techniques and statistical analysis to extract very small differences in
the power consumption signals. To be resistant to a DPA attack, some system
parameters or computation procedures must be randomized. Coron suggested three
countermeasures to protect against DPA:
1. Randomization of the private exponent: Let #E be the number of points of
the curve. The computation of Q = kP is done as follows:
• Select a random m-bit number d.
• Compute k′ = k + d #E.
• Compute the point Q = k′P. We have Q = kP since #EP = O.
2. Blinding Point P : The point P to be multiplied is “blinded” by adding a secret
random point R for which we have know S = kR. Scalar multiplication is done
by computing the point k(R + P ) and subtracting S = kR to get Q = kP.
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3. Randomized Projective Coordinates: The projective coordinates of a point are
not unique because:
(X, Y, Z) = (λX, λY, λZ) (5.1)
for every λ 6= 0 in the finite field. The third countermeasure randomizes the
projective coordinate representation of a point P = (X, Y, Z). Before each
new execution of the scalar multiplication algorithm for computing Q = kP,
the projective coordinates of P are randomized with a random value λ. The
randomization can also occur after each point addition and doubling.
An enhanced version of Coron’s 3rd countermeasure has been proposed by Joye
and Tymen [98]. It uses an isomorphism of an elliptic curve, thereby transposing
the computation into another curve through a random morphism. The elliptic point
P = (X, Y, Z) and parameters (a, b) of the defined curve equation can be randomized
like (λ2X,λ3Y, Z) and (λ4a, λ6b). However, all of the above countermeasures add
computational overhead and are still vulnerable to differential power attacks as
described below.
Doubling Attack
The doubling attack obtains the secret scalar using binary elliptic scalar multi-
plication [96]. It only works for the most-to-least version of the double-and-add
algorithm. The main idea of this attack is based on the fact that, even if an adver-
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sary cannot see whether the computation being done is doubling or addition, he can
still detect when the same operation is done twice. More precisely, if 2A and 2B are
computed in any operations, the attacker is not able to guess the value of A or B
but he can check if A = B or A 6= B. This assumption is reasonable since this kind
of computation usually takes many clock cycles and depends greatly on the value of
the operands. If the noise is negligible, a simple comparison of the two power traces
during the doubling will be efficient to detect this equality.
Two of Coron’s three proposed countermeasures against DPA attacks fail to
protect against a doubling attack: randomizing the private scalar (exponent) and
blinding the point. However, his third countermeasure, the randomized projective
coordinate does protect against a doubling attack as does a randomized exponenti-
ation algorithm such as the Ha and Moon algorithm [99] which maps a given scalar
to one of various representations. Since the positions of the zeros in the Ha and
Moon algorithm vary in each representation, the doubling attack cannot detect the
positions of the zeros for the doubling operation.
Basically, to protect against a doubling attack, the random blinding point R
should be randomly updated. A regularly updated method shouldn’t be chosen.
A method similar to Coron’s 3rd countermeasure or a random field isomorphism
should be used.
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RPA and ZPA Attacks
Goubin proposed a new power analysis in 2003, namely the refined power analysis
(RPA), which works even if one of the three countermeasures with a SPA coun-
termeasure is applied [94]. The RPA attack assumes that the attacker can input
adaptively chosen messages or elliptic curve points to the victim exponentiation
algorithm. Smart [100] analyzed the RPA attack in detail and discounted its ef-
fectiveness in a large number of order. For the remaining cases Smart proposed a
defense against the RPA attack based on isogenies of small degree [100]. However,
the RPA attack is still a threat to most elliptic curve cryptosystems.
The zero-value point attack is an extension of the RPA attack [95]. In a RPA
attack, the attacker uses a special point which has a zero-value coordinate. In
a ZPA attack, on the other hand, an attacker utilizes an auxiliary register which
might take a zero-value in the definition field. As a result, Coron’s 3rd or random
field isomorphism countermeasures do not protect against ZPA attacks.
To protect against RPA and ZPA attacks, the base point P or the secret scalar
k should be randomized. For example, Coron’s first two countermeasures protect
against these attacks. Mamiya et. al. [101] recently proposed a countermeasure,
called BRIP, which uses a random initial point R. The proposed countermeasure
computes kP + R and then subtracts R to get kP . Thus, no special point or zero-
value register will appear during all operations and hence it is resistant against both
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RPA and ZPA attacks.
Address-Bit Differential Power Analysis Attack
In 1999, Messerges et. al. proposed a new attack against secret key cryptosystems,
the address-bit DPA (ADPA), which analyzes a correlation between the secret in-
formation and addresses of registers [102]. Itoh et. al. in 2002 extended this attack
to Elliptic Curve based Cryptosystems [103]. Basically, ADPA Attack is based on
the correlation between bit values of the scalar and the location (address) of the
variables used in a scalar multiplication algorithm. The countermeasures used to
protect against simple power analysis and differential power analysis that are based
on randomization of the base point or the projective coordinate do not provide coun-
termeasure against address-bit analysis attacks. Therefore, these countermeasures
do not remove the correlation between the bit values of a scalar and the location
(address) of the variables used in a scalar multiplication algorithm.
A hardware-based DPA countermeasure proposed by May et. al. [104] is based on
Randomized Register Renaming (RRR). RRR is supposed to be implemented on a
processor called NDISC, which can execute instructions in parallel. In other words,
it requires a special hardware to work. Itoh et. al. gave several countermeasures
against the ADPA attack in [103]. But those countermeasures double the computing
time.
In 2003, Itoh et. al. proposed a countermeasure [105], called randomized address-
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ing method (RA), which is similar to RRR but does not require special hardware. In
RA, the addresses of registers are randomized by a random number for each scalar
exponentiation. Thus, all addresses of registers are randomized and hence the side
channel information are also randomized.
5.2 GF (2m) FPGA Implementations
Reconfigurable FPGAs were used in [21,22,25–36,38–40,42,44–47]. These implemen-
tations can be classified according to their arithmetic basis representations into two
classes: Optimal Normal Basis (ONB) based implementations [22, 25, 27, 30, 36,
45, 47] and Polynomial Basis (PB) based implementations [21,26,28,29,31–35,38–
40,42–44]. We are interested in optimal normal basis implementations only which
are described briefly below.
The first implementation of GF (2m) elliptic curves on FPGAs using optimal
normal basis was reported by Gao et. al. [22] in 1999 (Figure 5.1). Two FIFOs
(Figure 5.1) are used to serve as input/output buffers and the dual-port register file is
used to save input parameters and intermediate data. Gao et. al. [22] implemented
the same multiplier that Gao has developed earlier [80], while the implemented
inverter was that of Itoh and Tsujii [87]. The implementation was carried out on a
Xilinx XC4044XL FPGA with m = 53 bits.
Leung et. al. [25] reported an elliptic curve cryptosystem implementation on
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Figure 5.1: Gao et. al. ECC coprocessor [22].
a Xilinx FPGA XCV300 device with m = 113, 155, 281 bits. Point operations
were implemented as sequences of micro-coded field operations. This allows many
algorithmic optimization without changing the hardware. The entire design was
described by a module generator, which is a program written in Perl that takes the
key size m as an input parameter and produces a VHDL code of the elliptic curve
cryptoprocessor as an output. Thus, an arbitrary size of the cryptosystem can be
generated.
Leong et. al. [30] have reported another cryptoprocessor with a parallel version
of the field multiplier presented in [25] using a Xilinx Virtex XCV1000 FPGA device.
The architecture of the cryptoprocessor used in [25] and [30] is shown in Figure 5.2.
Ernst et. al. presented a generator-based design and validation methodology
for rapid prototyping of an elliptic curve cryptosystem hardware (Figure 5.3) [27].
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Figure 5.2: ECC processor architecture used by Leung et. al. [25] and Leong et. al.
[30]
A generator program accepts the two main parameters, key size and multiplier
radix, and generates a highly efficient RTL description, which can be synthesized
onto an FPGA. This approach allows the design to effortlessly exploit the available
resources on the FPGA for variable security and performance requirements. The
proposed generator approach on top of a VHDL based design flow has lead to a 270-
bit Cryptoprocessor design including three Massey and Omura serial multipliers.
The implementation used Xilinx FPGA XC4085XLA with m = 151, 191 and 270
bits.
The use of hybrid projective coordinates and hybrid basis representations over
GF (2m) was proposed by Bednara et. al. [36]. The main idea is to utilize attractive
features such as mixed coordinates as well as either of the polynomial or the normal
basis. The structure of the datapath architecture used is shown in Figure 5.4.
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Figure 5.3: Ernst et. al. ECC architecture [27].
Bednara et. al. used two squarers, two adders and four sequential multipliers. Each
of these arithmetic units (AU) can get operands from a dual-port operand memory,
a register, or directly from the output of another arithmetic unit. The arithmetic
control unit (ACU) generates control signals for all AUs, the operand memory and
the register. The second port of the operand memory is used by a host interface,
thus allowing for host data transfer while a point multiplication is being performed.
The AUs consist of one or two operand registers, one output register and the core
functional unit. The prototype implementation used a Xilinx FPGA XCV1000 with
m = 191 bits, Massy-Omura multiplier for normal basis and LFSR multiplier for
polynomial basis. The question arises here as to how efficient is such hybrid system
since we need conversion modules between polynomial and normal basis and vice
versa.
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Figure 5.4: Bednara et. al. ECC architecture [36].
Cheung et. al., presented a design generator for producing hardware designs for
elliptic curve cryptosystems over the finite field GF (2m) [45]. The design generator
can automatically produce implementations with different speed, size and level of
security. The major customizable elements of a cryptosystem are: the key size,
the degree of parallelism, and the protocols of the system. Parallel field multipliers
were used to exploit the inherent parallelism within point operations in projective
coordinate [16] to speedup scalar multiplication. The architecture of the proposed
cryptoprocessor is shown in Figure 5.5. The cryptoprocessor was implemented on
Xilinx FPGA XC2V6000 with m = 113 and 270 bits.
Recently, Al-Somani and Ibrahim in [47], presented an elliptic curve cryptopro-
cessor with resistance against timing attacks [93]. The proposed cryptoprocessor
is based on optimal normal basis representation and uses three multipliers to per-
form parallel field multiplications as shown in Figure 5.6. Point operations are
performed using Mixed coordinate system to increase the performance and the im-
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Figure 5.5: Cheung et. al. ECC architecture [45].
munity against timing attacks. The basic idea was to select a combination of point
addition and point doubling from Mixed coordinate system such that both point
operations take the same number of multiplication cycles. Thus, an attacker can-
not distinguish between point doubling and point addition and therefore it is not
possible to extract the key pattern using a timing attack. The implementation used
Xilinx XC2V8000 FPGA with m = 173 bits.
5.3 Remarks on the reviewed implementations
Reviewing these FPGA based implementations, several remarks need to be pointed
out:
• Most of the existing implementations were for prototyping purpose and FPGA
was only used as a vehicle.
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Figure 5.6: Al-Somani and Ibrahim ECC architecture [47].
• All of the existing implementations used existing FPGAs and none of them
proposed new FPGA architecture that targets such applications for higher
performance.
• Most of the implementations use polynomial basis (PB) representation, while
it is well known that optimal normal basis (ONB) is more suitable for hardware
implementations than polynomial basis.
• The comparisons between these implementations is somewhat difficult because
of their different objectives, constraints and FPGA implementation technology.
Table 5.1 summarizes reported ECC implementations on FPGAs over GF (2m).
It is clear from Table 5.1 that only one polynomial and another optimal normal
basis implementations among those reported have provided resistance to some power
analysis attack.
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Table 5.1: GF (2m) Implementations on FPGAs.
Ref. No. Year Platform Rep. Power Analysis
Attacks Resistance
Rosner [21] 1998 Xilinx XC4062 PB –
Gao [22] 1999 Xilinx XC4044XL ONB –
Leung [25] 2000 Xilinx XCV300 ONB –
Orlando [26] 2000 Xilinx XCV400E PB –
Ernst [27] 2001 Xilinx XC4085XLA ONB –
Smart [28] 2001 Xilinx XC4000XL PB –
Orlando [29] 2002 Xilinx XCV1000E PB –
Leong [30] 2002 Xilinx XCV1000 ONB –
Ernst [31] 2002 Atmel AT94K40 PB –
Gura [32, 33] 2002 Xilinx XCV2000E PB –
Jung [34] 2002 Atmel AT94K40 PB –
Kerins [35] 2002 Xilinx XCV2000 PB –
Bednara [36] 2002 Xilinx XCV1000 PB –
Lutz [38] 2004 Xilinx XCV2000E PB –
Mentens [39] 2004 Xilinx XCV800 PB –
Jarvinen [40] 2004 Xilinx XC2V8000 PB –
Saqib [42] 2004 Xilinx XCV3200 PB –
Batina [44] 2005 Xilinx XCV800 PB Simple Power Attacks
Cheung [45] 2005 Xilinx XC2V6000 ONB –
Al-Somani [47] 2006 Xilinx XC2V8000 ONB Timing Attacks
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5.4 Summary
In this chapter, power analysis attacks and their existing countermeasures have been
described. Power analysis attacks are usually divided into two types: (1) simple
power analysis attacks, and (2) differential power analysis attacks. Simple power
analysis attacks are based on a single observation of power consumption.
Differential power analysis attacks, on the other hand, combines simple power
analysis attacks with error-correcting techniques using statistical analysis tools.
Many of the existing countermeasures are vulnerable to the more recent differen-
tial power analysis attacks which include (1) refined power analysis attack, (2) zero
power analysis attack, (3) doubling attack, and (4) address-bit differential power
analysis attack.
Elliptic curve cryptosystem implementations on FPGA over GF (2m) using nor-
mal basis have been also surveyed in this chapter. Only one polynomial and an-
other optimal normal basis implementations among those reported have provided
resistance to some power analysis attack.
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Chapter 6
Secure ECC Cryptoprocessor
Architectures
Several elliptic curve cryptoprocessors have been proposed and implemented on FP-
GAs using optimal normal basis overGF (2m). None of the reported implementations
provides security against all known power analysis attacks. In this dissertation we
propose two GF (2m) ECC cryptoprocessors that are secure against all known DPA
attacks. One cryptoprocessor sequentially processes randomized key partitions in
random order, while the other is a parallel cryptoprocessor with each key partition
processed by an independent scalar multiplier.
The merits of these two cryptoprocessors are compared to a regular sequential
ECC single processor which is used as a reference for such comparison. The follow-
ing sections provide details of these three elliptic curve architectures; namely: (1)
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Figure 6.1: The proposed architecture
ECCNS: a non-secure elliptic curve cryptoprocessor architecture used as a reference
design for comparison, (2) ECCSS: the sequential cryptoprocessor architecture with
resistance against power analysis attacks and (3) ECCPS: the parallel cryptopro-
cessor architecture with resistance against power analysis attacks.
6.1 The ECCNS Cryptoprocessor
This section presents the architecture of a regular GF (2m) elliptic curve cryptopro-
cessor which does not provide security against power analysis attacks. The proposed
cryptoprocessor architecture is modeled using VHDL and is fully parameterized.
The basic units of this architecture are: (1) the main controller, (2) the data em-
bedding unit, (3) the point addition and doubling units and (4) the field arithmetic
units (adder, multiplier and inverter). In the following subsections, these units are
described in detail (Figure 6.1).
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6.1.1 Main Controller
The double-and-add algorithm has been selected for scalar multiplication (Algo-
rithm 3.1). For the encryption/decryption process, the selected encryption protocol
is the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman protocol. The pseudocode of the ECCNS cryp-
toprocessor is given in Algorithm 6.1.
The inputs of Algorithm 6.1 are: (1) the base point P , (2) the elliptic curve
parameters a, b, (3) the secret key k, (4) the encryption/decryption mode and
(5) the plaintext/ciphertext. The output is either the ciphertext or the plaintext
depending on the encryption/decryption mode.
Referring to the cryptoprocessor pseudocode (Algorithm 6.1, scalar multiplica-
tion starts at Step 1 by executing the double and and algorithm. The encryption
process starts at Step 2 by embedding the plaintext into a random point on the el-
liptic curve. The scalar multiplication result (kP ) is added to this point to produce
a ciphered point. The decryption process (Step 3), however, subtracts (kP ) from
the ciphered point.
6.1.2 Data Embedding
Data embedding is performed within the x-coordinate of a point on the elliptic curve.
A random number is picked to fill the 5 most significant bits and the remaining bits
will contain the data to be encrypted. If this x-coordinate is not a valid point on
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Algorithm 6.1 Pseudocode of the ECCNS cryptoprocessor.
Inputs: P : Base Point, k: Secret key, a, b: Elliptic curve parameters.
Plaintext/Ciphertext, Encryption/Decryption.
Outputs: Ciphertext/Plaintext.
Scalar Multiplication (kP ):
1. Algorithm 3.1(P, k).
Encryption/Decryption Process:
2. if (Encrypt) then
2.1. Embed the plaintext in random points on the elliptic curve.
2.2. ADD (kP ) to data points.
2.3. Output (ciphertext).
3. else
3.1. ADD (−kP ) to ciphered points.
3.2. Extract the plaintext from the data points.
3.3 Output (plaintext).
the elliptic curve, another random number is picked until a valid elliptic curve point
is obtained. The checking procedure is as follows [106]:
• Recall the elliptic curve equation defined over GF (2m):
y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b (6.1)
where a, b ∈ GF (2m) and b 6= 0.
• Rewrite Equation 6.1 as
y2 + xy + f(x) = 0 (6.2)
where f(x) = x3 + ax2 + b.
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• Let y = zx, Equation 6.2 becomes:
z2 + z + c = 0 (6.3)
where
c = f(x) · x−2 (6.4)
• Find the trace of c, the trace function is simply the parity function which can
be easily implemented by computing the XOR of all the bits.
• If the trace is 1, try another random number and repeat the check again. If the
trace is 0, this is a valid x-coordinate and proceed to recover the y-coordinate.
• By taking the square root of Equation 6.3, it can be rewritten as:
z1/2 = z + c1/2 (6.5)
which can be also rewritten as:
zi = zi−1 + ci (6.6)
• Since z + 1 is actually the complement of z in a normal basis, in one of the
two solutions the least significant bit will be 0 and the other one will be 1. We
then further compute all the other bits one by one.
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• To compute the y value, simply multiply z by x.
6.1.3 Point Addition and Doubling
Point addition and doubling are performed using Lopez-Dahab projective coordinate
system which takes the form (x, y) = (X/Z, Y/Z2) [64]. Point addition and point
doubling require only 14 and 5 field multiplications respectively (Table 2.3). The
projective elliptic curve equation of the affine Equation (6.1) is given by
Y 2 +XY Z = X3Z + aX2Z2 + bZ4 (6.7)
If Z = 0 in Equation 6.7, then Y 2 = 0, i.e., Y = 0. Therefore, (1, 0, 0) is the only
projective point that satisfies the equation for Z = 0. This is the point at infinity
O [64]. To convert an affine point (x, y) into Lopez-Dahab projective coordinate,
set X = x, Y = y, Z = 1. Similarly, to convert a projective point back to
affine coordinate, we compute x = X/Z, y = Y/Z2. The additive inverse of a point
P = (X,Y, Z) is the point (X,XZ+Y, Z) which is used at the end of the decryption
process [59].
The projective point operations formulas of the Lopez-Dahab coordinate system
[64] has been reported only for the most-to-least version of the scalar multiplica-
tion algorithm. Alternatively, point doubling and point addition formulas that are
suitable for both versions of the scalar multiplication algorithm are proposed here
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(Table 6.1). Clearly, the doubling formula requires only 5 field multiplications, 5
field squarings and 5 storage registers. The point addition formula requires 14 field
multiplications, 6 field squarings and 8 storage registers.
6.1.4 Field Operations
One key advantage of optimal normal basis representation is the simplicity of the
squaring operation. Field squaring is simply a cyclic shift operation. Field addition
is a Boolean XOR operation and is implemented using an m-bit XOR unit. Thus,
only one clock cycle is required to perform either of the two operations, i.e., field
squaring or field addition.
Multiplication is more complicated than addition and squaring. An efficient
multiplier is highly needed and is the key for efficient finite field computations. The
Sunar–Koc mulriplier has been selected since it provides the best space and time
complexities reported thus far [84].
The main idea of Sunar–Koc mulriplier is based on converting the two operands
to equivalent representations in another shifted basis, performing the multiplication
in that basis and converting the product back to the normal basis. The conversion
step requires only a single clock cycle since it is nothing but a permutation of the
normal basis. As explained in Chapter 4, two elements Aˆ and Bˆ ∈ GF (2m) are
represented in the shifted basis as:
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Aˆ =
m∑
i=1
aˆi(γ
i + γ−i) =
m∑
i=1
aˆiβi, and Bˆ =
m∑
i=1
bˆi(γ
i + γ−i) =
m∑
i=1
bˆiβi
The product Cˆ = Aˆ · Bˆ is written as:
Cˆ = (
m∑
i=1
aˆi(γ
i + γ−i))(
m∑
j=1
bˆj(γ
j + γ−j))
=
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
aˆibˆj(γ
i−j + γ−(i−j)) +
m∑
i=1
m−i∑
j=1
aˆibˆj(γ
i+j + γ−(i+j))
+
m∑
i=1
m−i∑
j=m−i+1
aˆibˆj(γ
2m+1−(i+j) + γ−(2m+1−(i+j)))
= Cˆ1 + Dˆ1 + Dˆ2
Sunar and Koc [84] precompute and store the results of âib̂j ∀ i, j ∈ 1, 2, ...,m
which requires m2 storage bits. Combination of these bits are then added modulo 2
using XOR gates to generate the m product bits. Assuming that the operands and
the resulting product are registered, 3m storage bits will be further required. Thus,
the space complexity of Sunar–Koc parallel multiplier is m2 AND gates+ 3
2
(m2−m)
XOR gates + (m2 + 3m) storage bits.
Since we are using FPGA as implementation technology to evaluate our proposed
architectures, we have opted for implementing a sequential version of the Sunar–Koc
multiplier to save on available FPGA resources. The proposed sequential multiplier
requires only three barrel shifters and three other registers alleviating the need for
precomputing and storing âib̂j ∀ i, j ∈ 1, 2, ...,m. The dataflow of the sequential
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multiplier is shown in Figure 6.2.
In Figure 6.2, the two operands A and B are passed to the conversion box to
convert A and B from normal basis to the shifted basis. The conversion box is used
for (1) converting the two operands A and B to the shifted basis and (2) converting
the product Ĉ, which is represented in the shifted basis, back to normal basis.
The pseudocode of the conversion box is given in Algorithm 6.2. To convert from
normal basis to the shifted basis and from the shifted basis to normal basis, the β
conversion vector is generated to keep the permutation order (Steps 1-2). The β
vector depends only on m and is computed only once at system startup. Steps 3-4
show the conversion process of the two operands A and B from normal basis to the
shifted basis. The conversion process of the product Ĉ from the shifted basis back
to normal basis is performed at Steps (5-6).
The circuits of the Ĉ1, D̂1 and D̂2 units are shown in Figures 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5
respectively. Figure 6.3 shows that we only need 2 AND gates and 1 XOR gate to
produce a bit to the barrel shifter. Accordingly, (m − 1) copies of these gates are
required to produce the required bits to the barrel shifter in each iteration. The
barrel shifter is controlled by the index i which is incremented by one each clock
cycle. In each clock cycle, the barrel shifter content is accumulated into the Ĉ1
register. A total of (m − 1) clock cycles is required for Ĉ1 to be computed. The
pseudocode of Ĉ1 is given in Algorithm 6.3.
The circuit of D̂1 (Figure 6.4) is much simpler than Ĉ1 since it requires only
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Algorithm 6.2 Pseudocode of the conversion box unit.
Inputs: A,B/Ĉ, to–shifted–basis/to–normal–basis.
Outputs: Â, B̂/C.
β Conversion vector:
1. for i in 0 to m− 1 do
1.1. if (2i ≤ m) then
1.1.1. βi = 2
i
1.2. else if (2i mod 2m+ 1) ≤ m then
1.2.1. βi = 2
i mod 2m+ 1
1.3. else
1.3.1. βi = 2m+ 1− 2i mod 2m+ 1
2. end for
Conversion to Shifted Basis:
3. if (to–shifted–basis) then
3.1. for i in 0 to m− 1 do
3.1.1. Âβi = Ai
3.1.2. B̂βi = Bi
3.2. end for
4. Output (Â, B̂).
Conversion Back to Normal Basis:
5. if (to–normal–basis) then
5.1. for i in 0 to m− 1 do
5.1.1. Ci = Ĉβi
5.2. end for
6. Output (C).
1 AND to produce 1 bit for the barrel shifter which is controlled by the index i.
Similarly, (m − 1) copies of these gates are needed to produce the required bits to
the barrel shifter in each iteration. It takes (m−1) clock cycles to compute D̂1. The
circuit of D̂2 (Figure 6.5) has the same circuitry as D̂1, but the difference is that it
requires m copies of the gates and accordingly requires m clock cycles to complete.
Since both Ĉ1 and D̂1 require (m − 1) clock cycles, the content of Ĉ1 and D̂1 are
added together and the result is added to the content of D̂2 to produce Ĉ. The
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pseudocode of D̂1 and D̂2 are given in Algorithms 6.4 and 6.5 respectively.
Finally, Ĉ is passed to the conversion box to convert it from the shifted basis
back to normal basis. Thus, the multiplication process requires two extra clock
cycles for conversion in each multiplication; one clock cycle for converting A and B
to the shifted basis and another clock cycle for converting Ĉ back to normal basis.
The time complexity of the proposed sequential multiplier in the shifted basis is
(m− 1)(TA + 2TX) + 2TX , while the space complexity is:
• m storage bits for the β conversion vector.
• 3m storage bits for the converted operands and result.
• (2m− 2) AND gates + (2m− 1) XOR gates + 2m storage bits for C1.
• (m− 1) AND gates + m XOR gates + 2m storage bits for D1.
• m AND gates + m XOR gates + 2m storage bits for D2.
• m XOR gates used between C1 and D1.
• m XOR gates used between D2 and shifted C register.
Thus, the space complexity of the proposed serial multiplier is (4m − 3) AND
gates+ (6m− 1) XOR gates + 10m storage bits.
The incryption/decryption process requires only one inversion since we are using
projective coordinate, while an inversion per trial is required for data embedding
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Figure 6.2: Dataflow of the proposed sequential multiplier.
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in a valid x-coordinate (Equation 6.4). Thus, an efficient inverter is required. The
selected inverter is the Itoh and Tsujii inverter [87]. The dataflow of the Itoh–Tsujii
inverter is shown in Figure 6.6. Figure 6.6 shows that Itoh–Tsujii inverter requires
three cyclic shift registers, one barrel shifter, one down counter and one multiplier
(note that only one multiplier is used while two are drawn in the dataflow diagram
for the purpose of clarity).
In Figure 6.6, the down counter s controls the barrel shifter r in each iteration.
The barrel shifter r, accordingly, controls the required number of squarings by the
cyclic shift register q. The least bit of the barrel shifter r0, on the other hand, decides
if the multiplication of the content of the cyclic shift register t by a is required or
not. The Itoh–Tsujii inversion algorithm is given in Algorithm 6.6. Clearly, the
inverter depends a lot on the field multiplier. The Itoh–Tsujii inversion algorithm
requires only O(log2(m)) multiplications, which is the best among other inversion
algorithms reported thus far [76].
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Figure 6.3: Circuit of C1, i = [1, m− 1], j = [2, m].
Algorithm 6.3 Pseudocode of Ĉ1.
Inputs: Â, B̂.
Outputs: Ĉ1.
1. for i in 1 to m− 1 do
1.1. for j in 1 to m− 1 do in Parallel
1.1.1. t̂j−1 = (âi AND b̂j) XOR (âj AND b̂i)
1.2. end for
1.3. Shift Right T̂ by i− 1
1.4. Ĉ1 = Ĉ1 XOR T̂
2. end for
3. Output (Ĉ1).
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Figure 6.4: Circuit of D1, i = [1, m− 1], j = [1, m− 1].
Algorithm 6.4 Pseudocode of D̂1.
Inputs: Â, B̂.
Outputs: D̂1.
1. for i in 1 to m-1 do
1.1. for j in 1 to m− 1 do in Parallel
1.1.1. t̂j+1 = âi AND b̂j
1.2. end for
1.3. Shift Left T̂ by i− 1
1.4. D̂1 = D̂1 XOR T̂
2. end for
3. Output (D̂1).
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Figure 6.5: Circuit of D2, i = [1, m], j = [1, m].
Algorithm 6.5 Pseudocode of D̂2.
Inputs: Â, B̂.
Outputs: D̂2.
1. for i in m to 1 do
1.1. for j in m to 1 do in Parallel
1.1.1. t̂m−j+1 = âj AND b̂i
1.2. end for
1.3. Shift Left T̂ by m− i
1.3. D̂2 = D̂2 XOR T̂
2. end for
3. Output (D̂2).
91
Figure 6.6: Dataflow of the Itoh and Tsujii inverter [87].
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Algorithm 6.6 Itoh–Tsujii inversion algorithm.
Inputs: a
Output: l = a−1
1. set s← blog2(m− 1)c − 1.
2. set p← a.
3. for i = s down to 0 do
3.1. set r ← shift m− 1 to right by s bit(s)
3.2. set q ← p
3.3. rotate q to left by br/2c bit(s)
3.4. set t← p× q
3.5. if least bit of r = 1,
3.5.1 rotate t to left by 1 bit.
3.5.2 p← t× a
3.5. else
3.5.3 p← t
3.6. s← s− 1
4. rotate p to left by 1 bit.
5. set l← p.
6. return l.
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Table 6.1: Lopez-Dahab Projective Coordinate System.
Point Doubling Point Addition
T1 ← X1 T1 ← X0
T2 ← Y1 T2 ← Y0
T3 ← Z1 T3 ← Z0
T4 ←
√
b T4 ← X1
T3 ← T 23 T5 ← Y1
T4 ← T3 × T4 T6 ← Z1
T4 ← T 24 T7 ← T3 × T6 = E
T1 ← T 21 T1 ← T1 × T6 = B1
T3 ← T1 × T3 = Z2 T4 ← T3 × T4 = B0
T1 ← T 21 T1 ← T1 + T4 = D
T1 ← T1 + T4 = X2 T3 ← T 23
T2 ← T 22 T6 ← T 26
if a 6= 0 then T3 ← T3 × T5 = A0
T5 ← a T6 ← T2 × T6 = A1
T5 ← T3 × T5 T6 ← T3 + T6 = C
T2 ← T2 + T5 T2 ← T1 × T7 = F
T2 ← T2 + T4 T1 ← T 21
T2 ← T1 × T2 T8 ← T 27
T4 ← T3 × T4 T8 ← a× T8
T2 ← T2 + T4 = Y2 T8 ← T2 + T8
T5 ← T1 × T8 = G
T8 ← T2 × T6 = H
T6 ← T 26
T6 ← T6 + T8
T6 ← T5 + T6 = X2
T4 ← T1 × T4
T4 ← T4 × T7
T4 ← T4 + T6 = I
T3 ← T1 × T3
T3 ← T3 + T6 = J
T4 ← T4 × T8
T2 ← T 22 = Z2
T2 ← T2 × T3
T8 ← T3 + T4 = Y2
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6.2 The ECCSS Cryptoprocessor
This section presents an original sequential elliptic curve cryptoprocessor which pro-
vides resistance against power analysis attacks at different levels. The private key
is divided into a number of partitions that are processed independently. Security
measures against power analysis attacks are provided at several levels: the key level,
the key partition level and the individual bit level.
At the key level, the key is divided into a number of partitions which are sequen-
tially processed in a randomized order. The points resulting from processing these
key partitions are accumulated to produce the scalar product kP . Each key parti-
tion is associated with a precomputed point to keep its significance [73, 74]. The
precomputed points are computed off-line and stored to be reused as needed. To
increase the resistance against power analysis attacks, the key partitioning process,
i.e. defining new key partition sizes and computing the corresponding values of the
precomputed points, is performed from time to time.
Increasing the number of key partitions increases immunity against power anal-
ysis attacks since more key partitions provides more permutations. Increasing the
number of key partitions, however, requires more storage for the precomputed points
and more point additions to assimilate the partial computations into the final scalar
product kP .
At the key partition level, two security countermeasures are adopted. The en-
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coding of each key partition is randomly selected to be either in binary form or in
Non-Adjacent-Form (NAF)[107]. Furthermore, at the key partition level, the di-
rection of bit inspection for each key partition is randomly assigned to be either
most-to-least or least-to-most if binary encoding is selected.
Finally, at the bit level, each zero in the key, may randomly perform a dummy
point addition operation in addition to the doubling operation. Such zeros random-
ization increases the security and saves an average of 50% of the extra dummy point
additions used in the double-and-add-always algorithm (Algorithm 5.1).
The multilevel protection scheme fully confuses any relation between the secret
key and any leaked information resulting in a fairly secure system with minimal area
and delay overhead. An attacker of such system will be totally confused with leaked
information in such multilevel resistance secure environment.
6.2.1 Key Partitioning
The key is divided into u partitions as:
k = k(u−1)||k(u−2)||...||k(1)||k(0)
To compute the scalar product kP , these partitions are associated with a set of pre-
computed points to keep the significance of each key partition, thus these partitions
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can be processed independently either sequentially or in parallel.
kP = (k(u−1)||k(u−2)||...||k(1)||k(0)).P
= (2size(u−1).k(u−1) + 2size(u−2).k(u−2) + ...+ 2size(1).k(1) + k(0)).P
= (2size(u−1)P ).k(u−1) + (2size(u−2)P ).k(u−2) + ...+ (2size(1)P ).k(1) + (P )k(0)
= Pu−1.k(u−1) + Pu−2.k(u−2) + ...+ P1.k(1) + P0k(0)
= Pu−1.k(u−1) + Pu−2.k(u−2) + ...+ P1.k(1) + Pk(0)
where Pi (i = 1, 2, ..., u− 1) is the precomputed point associated with key partition
k(i) and size(j)=(
j−1∑
i=0
size of key partition k(i)). Thus, each partition k(i) is associated
with a precomputed point Pi forming the pair:
(k(i), Pi)
where P0 = P .
The key partition sizes may be equal or different. For equal sizes, the key par-
tition size is equal to dm
u
e for u key partitions. While equal sizes allow for simpler
design, different size key partitions provides more security. In this work, different
key sizes are used and the key partition sizes are randomly adjusted to avoid future
attacks on equal key partition sizes.
Precomputed points are computed using a sequence of doubling operations of
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the base point P . For u key partitions, the required number of precomputed points
is (u− 1). The resulting points of processing these key partitions are assimilated at
the end to produce the scalar multiplication product kP =
u−1∑
i=0
k(i)Pi where P0 = P .
A new set of precomputed points should be generated whenever the base point P
or the number or sizes of key partitions are changed. In elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman
protocol (Section 2.5.1), precomputations are performed off-line only once at the
beginning since the base point of the two parties are not changed. Precomputations,
however, should be performed whenever the number or sizes of key partitions are
changed.
Alternatively, in elliptic curve ElGamal protocol (Section 2.5.2), the public point
of the receiver is considered as the sender’s base point. Accordingly, the sender uses
this point together with his own key partitions to compute the required precomputed
points once off-line. If another session is established between the two parities, new
precomputed points need to be generated only if the sender changes his/her private
key, the number of key partitions or the sizes of these partitions. The receiver, on the
other hand, needs to generate a new set of precomputed points whenever the sender
changes his/her private key or the number or sizes of the receiver key partitions are
changed.
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6.2.2 Multilevel Resistance Measures
To protect against power analysis attacks several resistance measures have been
adopted to render the scalar multiplication process secure against these attacks. The
private key consists of a group of bits with every bit having a particular position and
a particular bit value. The adopted resistance measures depend on confusing not
only the bit values but also the key bit positions. Thus, even if leaked information
can identify the type of performed operation, e.g. point doubling or point addition,
attackers can neither be sure of the corresponding key bit value nor its position.
Several resistance measures are proposed at different levels; the key level, the
key partition level and the bit level. These resistance measures are described below.
Resistance Measures at The Key Level
The objective of the resistance measures at the key level is to confuse the key
bit positions, thus leaked information cannot be associated with a known key bit
position. The key is divided into u partitions which are sequentially processed in
a randomized order to increase the resistance against power analysis attacks. The
number of key partitions and their sizes are changed from time to time, which
would require computing new associated precomputed points. Such computation is
performed off-line.
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Resistance Measures at The Key Partition Level
At this level, two resistance measures against power analysis attacks are proposed.
First, to confuse the bit value, the encoding of each key partition is randomized to
use either binary encoding or NAF encoding. In a NAF encoding, signed binary digit
representation is used, i.e., each bit may be 0, 1 or 1. NAF has the property that
no two consecutive bits are nonzero. Every integer has a unique NAF encoding.
Moreover, NAF encoding has the fewest nonzero bits of any binary signed digit
representation of an integer (Algorithm 6.7).
Second, to confuse the bit position, if binary encoding is selected in a particu-
lar key partition, the direction of bit inspection for this key partition is randomly
assigned to be either most-to-least or least-to-most. This adds another level of re-
sistance even if an attacker guessed correctly that a certain bit belongs to a certain
key partition.
Algorithm 6.7 NAF encoding algorithm.
Inputs: A positive integer k.
Output: NAF(k).
Initialization:
1. i = 0.
2. While k ≥ 1 do
1.1. if k mod 2 = 1 then
1.1.1. k′i = 2− (k mod 22)
1.1.2. k = k − k′i
1.2. else
1.2.1. k′i = 0
1.3. k = k/2
1.4. i = i+ 1
3. Output (k′)
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Resistance Measures at The Bit Level
In the double-and-add-always algorithm (Algorithm 5.1), point doubling and addi-
tion are performed in each iteration regardless of the key bit value ki. In Algorithm
5.1, the value of ki is inspected such that:
• if ki = 1, the results of doubling and addition are committed, otherwise
• if ki = 0, only the result of doubling is committed while that of addition is
ignored.
This simple approach caused the scalar multiplication to be resistant against
SPA only. The drawback of this approach, however, is the delay overhead due to
the extra dummy point additions and its vulnerability to DPA. In this work, another
resistance technique is introduced at the bit level where a dummy point addition
is randomly performed if ki = 0. Thus, if the value of ki is zero, a dummy point
addition operation may or may not be performed based on the value of some random
bit r as follows:
• if r = 1, perform the doubling operation together with a dummy addition
operation.
• otherwise if r = 0, only the doubling operation is performed.
The most-to-least version of the proposed randomized bit algorithm is given
in Algorithm 6.8. In Algorithm 6.8, point doubling is always performed in Step
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2.1. Point additions are performed according to the value of ki and the random
bit r at Step 2.2.1. Similarly, Algorithm 6.9 shows the least-to-most version of the
randomized bit algorithm. In Algorithm 6.9, point addition is performed according
to the value of ki and the random bit r at Step 3.1.1 while point doubling is always
performed at Step 3.2.
Algorithm 6.8 The Randomized bit Algorithm (most-to-least)
Inputs: P :A precomputed point, k:A key partition, ksize.
Output: kP : Partial scalar product.
Initialization:
1. Q[0] = P · k(ksize−1)
Scalar Multiplication:
2. for i from ksize − 2 to 0 do
2.1. Q[0] = 2Q[0]
2.2. if (ki = 1 or r = 1) then
2.2.1. Q[1] = Q[0] + P
2.3. Q[0] = Q[ki]
3. Output (Q[0])
Algorithm 6.9 The Randomized bit Algorithm (least-to-most)
Inputs: P :A precomputed point, k:A key partition, ksize.
Output: kP : Partial scalar product.
Initialization:
1. Q[0] = P
2. Q[1] = O
3. for i from 0 to ksize − 1 do
3.1. if (ki = 1 or r = 1) then
3.1.1. Q[2] = Q[1] +Q[0]
3.2. Q[0] = 2Q[0]
3.3. Q[1] = Q[1 + ki]
4. Output (Q[1])
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Example
Figure 6.7 shows an example of key partitioning and execution scheduling. In the
example of Figure 6.7, the key length is 16-bit. The first step is to partition the key
k into a number of partitions (4 in this example), i.e.,
k = k(3)‖k(2)‖k(1)‖k(0) (6.8)
The second step is to randomly arrange the key partitions to form the new
randomized key.
knew = k
(2)‖k(0)‖k(1)‖k(3) (6.9)
The third step is to randomly encode each key partition either in binary or
NAF representation and randomly assign the direction of inspection of key partition
bits (most-to-least or least-to-most) if binary encoding is selected. Note that key
partition k(3) is encoded in NAF representation. Finally, the fourth step shows how
the randomized zeros algorithm behaves.
Security, Space and Time Analysis
Although an attacker may be able to distinguish the double and add point op-
erations, the adopted multi-level resistance measures do not allow the attacker to
associate this operation with a specific key bit position on one hand, nor to ascertain
a particular binary bit value to it on the other.
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Figure 6.7: Multilevel resistance measures.
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The multi-level resistance measures will confuse prospective attackers regarding
the exact bit positions of the key since:
1. Key partitions are processed in a randomized order.
2. The inspection direction of key partitions that are encoded in binary is ran-
domized (either most-to-least or least-to-most).
3. Key partitions that are NAF encoded may have a size that is greater by 1 bit
than its corresponding binary encoded partition size.
Furthermore, key bit values cannot be definitely ascertained by prospective at-
tackers. Even if a given bit appears to an attacker as if it is a binary 1 its true value
cannot be ascertained since this bit may (1) have a true binary 1 value, (2) have a
true binary 0 value with a dummy add operation or (3) have a 1 value in case of
NAF encoding. Likewise, a recognized zero-bit, may be (1) a true zero in the binary
form or (2) a zero in a NAF encoding.
Resistance against the double attack [96] is achieved because double attack tar-
gets the most-to-least version of the double-and-add algorithm. The proposed cryp-
toprocessor is designed to perform both versions of the double-and-add algorithm
even at the key partition level.
Furthermore, the proposed sequential architecture is also secure against RPA and
ZPA. To protect against RPA and ZPA, either the base point P or the secret scalar
k should be randomized. The proposed key partitioning with random processing
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order scheme, random partition encoding, random partition bits inspection direction
and random dummy additions makes the secret scalar k appear as if it is totally
randomized.
The proposed multilevel randomization techniques make it very difficult to estab-
lish a correlation between the secret information and addresses of registers. Thus,
the proposed cryptoprocessor is secure against ADPA.
Even though increasing the number of key petitions provides more security, an
increased number of key partitions (u) results in more space overhead since the
number of precomputed points (u− 1) will increase accordingly. Likewise, the delay
overhead will also increase by increasing the number of key partitions since (u− 1)
extra point additions are required to assimilate the partial results to produce the
scalar product kP .
NAF encoding requires, on the average, m
3
point additions and hence provides
better time performance than binary encoding which requires, on the average, m
2
point additions. NAF encoding, however, requires signed bit representation and
may increase the size of key partition by at most 1 bit.
The inspection direction does not cause any delay overhead since the time re-
quired to perform scalar multiplication using Algorithm 6.8 is the same time required
by Algorithm 6.9 which requires one more point storage than what Algorithm 6.8
requires.
While dummy computations caused by the randomized bit algorithms (Algo-
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rithms 6.8 and 6.9) increases the degree of confusion, it does increase the number
of point additions. Although this may significantly increase the time overhead, it is
still a more attractive approach compared to the double-and-add-always algorithm
(Algorithm 5.1).
6.2.3 ECCSS Architecture and Operation
Both of the ECCNS and the ECCSS cryptoprocessors use the same basic blocks
which include: (1) the point addition and doubling units, (2) the field arithmetic
units (multiplier and inverter) and (3) the data embedding unit. The two cryptopro-
cessors differ only in the control path and the number of extra registers used by the
the ECCSS cryptoprocessor to store the precomputed points and the accumulation
point.
The pseudocode of ECCSS is given in Algorithm 6.10. Algorithm 6.10 uses the
same inputs/outputs as Algorithm 6.1. Key partitioning, precomputations, precom-
puted point association with key partitions are assumed to be performed off-line.
The key is partitioned into u partitions. Sizes of key partitions may be equal or
different. Different key partition sizes provides more security. Thus, the size of key
partitions are randomly adjusted to avoid future attacks on equal key partition sizes.
If NAF encoding is selected, the key partition size may be increased by up to one
bit since NAF encoding requires at most one extra bit.
Precomputations are performed by repeated double operations in Steps 1-3 ac-
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cording to key partition sizes. The number of required precomputed points are
(u − 1). Each key partition k(i) is associated with a particular precomputed point
Pi to keep the significance of each key partition (Step 4).
Scalar multiplication starts at Step 5 after random arrangement of key partitions.
The inspection direction is randomly selected if a key partition is binary encoded.
Steps 5.1-5.1.1 show the steps if the inspection direction is most-to-least with binary
encoding. If NAF encoding is used, each bit of the scalar multiplier k′(i) is recoded
in NAF representation and accordingly point operations are performed (Steps 5.2.1-
5.2.3). Each partition is processed as if it is a key itself. The partial points resulting
from processing the individualized key partitions are accumulated in the point R
(Step 5.3) which requires (u− 1) extra point additions.
6.3 The ECCPS Cryptoprocessor
This section describes our proposed high performance parallel elliptic curve cryp-
toprocessor with resistance against power analysis attacks. The main idea is to
partition the secret key into a number of partitions, as described in Section 6.2.1,
that are processed in parallel by independent scalar multiplication units. Key parti-
tions inspection direction (most-to-least or least-to-most) are independently selected
for each scalar multiplication unit in a randomized manner.
Parallel inspection of the key bits cause point operations being executed by the
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Algorithm 6.10 Pseudocode of the ECCSS cryptoprocessor.
Inputs: P : Base Point, k: Secret key, a, b: Elliptic curve parameters,
Plaintext/Ciphertext, Encryption/Decryption.
Outputs: Ciphertext/Plaintext.
Key Partitioning: k = k(u−1)||k(u−2)||...||k(1)||k(0), for u key partitions.
Initialization: Q = P , R = O.
Precomputation:
1. P0 = Q.
2. for i = 1 to u− 1 do
2.1. for j = 0 to k
(i−1)
size − 1 do
2.1.1 Q = 2Q
2.2. end for
2.3. Pi = Q
3. end for
Key Partitions Association with Precomputed Points:
4. for i = 0 to u− 1 do (k′(i), Pi).
Key after random rearrangement: k′ = k′(u−1)||k′(u−2)||...||k′(1)||k′(0).
Scalar Multiplication (R = kP ):
5. for i = 0 to u− 1 do
5.1 if (Binary) then
5.1.1. if (most-to-least) then Q = Algorithm 6.8 (k′(i), Pi, k
′(i)
size)
5.1.2. else Q = Algorithm 6.9 (k′(i), Pi, k
′(i)
size)
5.2. else (NAF)
5.2.1. j = 0, t = k′(i), Q[0] = P , Q[1] = O
5.2.2. While t ≥ 1 do
5.2.2.1. if t mod 2 = 1 then
5.2.2.1.1. k
′(i)
j = 2− (t mod 22)
5.2.2.1.2. t = t− k′(i)j
5.2.2.2. else
5.2.2.2.1. k
′(i)
j = 0
5.2.2.3. t = t/2, j = j + 1
5.2.2.4. if (k
′(i)
j = 1 or r = 1) then Q[2] = Q[1] +Q[0]
5.2.2.5. else if (k
′(i)
j = −1 or r = 1) then Q[2] = Q[1]−Q[0]
5.2.2.6. Q[0] = 2Q[0]
5.2.2.7. Q[1] = Q[1+ | k′(i)j |]
5.2.3. Q = Q[1]
5.3. R = R +Q
6. end for
Encryption/Decryption Process: Same as in Algorithm 6.1.
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scalar multiplication units to overlap at various stages of point and individual field
operations. Thus, multiple field operations are fused together causing the power
trace of these simultaneous operations to confuse the nature of point operations
being performed by the parallel scalar multiplication units. Furthermore, the ran-
domized inspection order of each key partition increases immunity against power
analysis attacks. This adds another layer of security and confuses attackers moni-
toring power trace.
The number of key partitions is limited by the number of available scalar multi-
plication units. Each key partition is associated with a precomputed point to keep
its significance. Precomputed points are computed off-line and stored to be reused
as needed. For u key partitions, (u− 1) precomputed points are are required. The
selection of these points depends on the number and sizes of the key partitions.
Each partition is associated with a precomputed point Pi as:
(k(i), Pi) (6.10)
where P0 = P .
The sizes of key partitions may be equal or different. For u key partitions, u
scalar multiplication units are required since each key partition requires an individual
scalar multiplication unit. An extra scalar multiplication unit is also required to
accumulate the partial computations into the final scalar product kP . Different key
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partition sizes allows for optimizing the required number of scalar multiplication
units. The scalar multiplication unit with the smallest key partition size can be
utilized to accumulate the partial computations into the final scalar product kP .
This saves the need for extra scalar multiplication unit which is needed for points
accumulation.
Using different key partition sizes also increases the immunity against power
analysis attacks and future attacks on fixed key partition size. Thus, different key
partitions sizes are used in this work. To increase the resistance against power
analysis attacks more, the key partitioning process and accordingly precomputation
process of the required precomputed points are performed from time to time.
The ECCPS cryptoprocessor does not need extra dummy operations as per-
formed in the ECCSS cryptoprocessor. Hence, high performance is achieved while,
at the same time, improving the resistance against power analysis attacks. Leaked
information, in this case, are quite confusing since it will be a combination of different
point operations being performed at the same time. The proposed cryptoprocessor
requires several scalar multipliers to perform scalar multiplications in parallel as
depicted in Figure 6.8.
Example
Figure 6.9 shows an example of the parallel execution of key partitions. In the
example of Figure 6.9, the key length is 16-bits. The first step is to precompute
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Figure 6.8: The proposed parallel architecture.
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several points and store them in registers. Each of these precomputed points is
associated with exactly one key partition.
The second step is to partition the key k into u key partitions (u = 4 in this
example). Thus,
k = k(3)‖k(2)‖k(1)‖k(0) (6.11)
The third step is to randomly assign the direction of inspection of key parti-
tion bits (most-to-least or least-to-most). The fourth step is the parallel execution
of scalar multiplications as illustrated in Figure 6.9. In Lopeaz–Dahab projective
coordinate system, point addition requires mainly 14 multiplications while point
doubling requires only 5 multiplications (Table 6.1). Thus, point addition requires
around three times as many multiplications required by point doubling. Accord-
ingly, leaked information at a certain point in time will be a combination of field
operations of point doubling, additions and no operations (Figure 6.9). This makes
it very difficult to infer the key from any leaked information. Finally, the resulting
points of all partition are assimilated to produce the final scalar product kP (note
that an extra scalar multiplication unit is used in Figure 6.9 to accumulate to partial
products for the purpose of clarity).
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Figure 6.9: Key partitioning and parallel execution.
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6.3.1 ECCPS Architecture and Operation
As shown in Figure 6.8, the architecture of the ECCPS cryptoprocessor is different
from the architecture of the ECCSS cryptoprocessor. The ECCPS cryptoprocessor
uses parallel scalar multiplication units. The number of these scalar multiplication
units depends on the number of the key partitions. Each scalar multiplier consists
of: (1) a field multiplier, (2) a point addition unit, and (3) a point doubling unit.
The field arithmetic units (adder and inverter) and the data embedding unit are
identical to those used in the ECCNS and the ECCSS cryptoprocessors.
The pseudocode of ECCPS is given in Algorithm 6.11. Key partitioning, pre-
computations, precomputed point association with key partitions are assumed to
be performed off-line. The key is partitioned into u partitions. Different key par-
tition sizes are used and the sizes of these key partitions are adjusted randomly.
Precomputations are performed by repeated doubles in Steps 1-3 according to sizes
of key partitions and the number of required precomputed points are (u− 1). Each
key partition k(i) is associated with a particular precomputed point Pi to keep the
significance of each key partition (Steps 4-5).
Parallel scalar multiplications start at Step 6. The inspection direction of each
key partition is randomly selected. Modified versions of the double-and-add al-
gorithms (Algorithms 6.12 and 6.13) are proposed here to be used by each scalar
multiplier since key partitions have different sizes. Each partition is processed as
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if it is a key itself. The resulting points of each execution of Algorithms 6.8 and
6.9 are accumulated in the point R (Step 6.3) which requires (u − 1) extra point
additions. The time required to perform these extra additions is not significant since
the accumulation process is performed as soon as a point is produced by a scalar
multiplication unit. Finally, the encryption/decryption process is exactly the same
as performed in the ECCNS cryptoprocessor.
6.3.2 Security, Space and Time Analysis
In addition to high speed operation, the proposed parallel architecture provides a
built-in countermeasure against power analysis attacks which ensures that attackers
can not distinguish between point operations or their boundaries. The overlapped
parallel point and field operations and random key partition inspection order confuse
attackers about which bits of which partitions of the key are being processed.
Increasing the number of key partitions increases the immunity against power
analysis attacks as well as the speedup factor. The required space, however, increases
significantly as more key partitions are used since each key partition requires an in-
dividual scalar multiplier. Accordingly, there is tradeoff between speed and security
on one hand and area on the other with different resistance strength against power
analysis attacks.
The double attacks [96] cannot be applied to the ECCPS cryptoprocessor because
double attacks only target the most-to-least version of the sequential double-and-
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add algorithm. The proposed cryptoprocessor architecture performs parallel scalar
multiplications and implements both versions of the double-and-add algorithm ran-
domly.
Furthermore, the proposed cryptoprocessor is also secure against RPA and ZPA
since leaked information about the key are both overlapped and randomized. It is
very difficult for an attacker to infer the secret key.
Finally, correlations between the secret information and addresses of registers
are extremely hard to be analyzed since parallelism and randomization are employed
together. Thus, the proposed cryptoprocessor is also secured against ADPA.
6.4 Summary
In this chapter, three elliptic curve cryptoprocessor architectures for curves defined
over GF (2m) have been proposed. Two of these architectures are designed to be
secure against power analysis attacks, while the third non-secure one is designed to
be used as a reference model for area and delay comparisons.
The proposed power analysis attack resistant cryptoprocessors include one se-
quential and another parallel cryptoprocessor architectures. The sequential cryp-
toprocessor architecture uses multilevel resistance measures against power analysis
attacks. These include resistance measures at the key level, the key partition level,
and at the bit level.
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At the key level, the key is divided into a number of partitions which are se-
quentially processed in a randomized order. The encoding of each key partition is
randomly selected to be either in binary or in Non-Adjacent-Form (NAF) at the
key partition level. Furthermore, at the key partition level, the direction of bit
inspection for binary encoded key partitions is randomly assigned to be either most-
to-least or least-to-most. Finally, the zeros, at the bit level, are randomized to
appear sometimes as ones by performing dummy point additions.
The proposed parallel cryptoprocessor provides high speed through using parallel
scalar multipliers that operate in parallel on different key partitions. Parallel scalar
multiplications of different key partitions are exploited as a countermeasure against
power analysis attacks. Furthermore, the inspection order of each key partition is
randomly decided to increase the immunity against power analysis attacks. The
parallel cryptoprocessor does not need extra dummy operations as performed in the
sequential processor.
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Algorithm 6.11 Pseudocode of the ECCPS cryptoprocessor.
Inputs: P : Base Point, k: Secret key, a, b: Elliptic curve parameters,
Plaintext/Ciphertext, Encryption/Decryption.
Outputs: Ciphertext/Plaintext.
Key Partitioning:
k = k(u−1)||k(u−2)||...||k(1)||k(0), where u is the number of key partitions.
Initialization:
Q = P , R = O.
Precomputation:
1. P0 = Q.
2. for i = 1 to u− 1 do
2.1. for j = 0 to k
(i−1)
size − 1 do
2.1.1 Q = 2Q
2.2. end for
2.3. Pi = Q
3. end for
Key Partitions Association with Precomputed Points:
4. for i = 0 to u− 1 do
4.1. (k(i), Pi).
5. end for
Parallel Scalar Multiplication (R = kP ):
6. for i = 0 to u− 1 do in Parallel
6.1 if (most-to-least) then
6.1.1. Q = Algorithm 6.12 (k(i), Pi, k
(i)
size)
6.2 else
6.2.1. Q = Algorithm 6.13 (k(i), Pi, k
(i)
size)
6.3. R = R +Q.
7. end for
Encryption/Decryption Process: Same as in Algorithm 6.1.
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Algorithm 6.12 Modified double-and-add scalar multiplication algorithm (most-
to-least).
Inputs: P : A precomputed point, k: A key partition, ksize.
Output: kP : Partial scalar product.
Initialization:
1. Q = P · k(ksize−1)
Scalar Multiplication:
2. for i = ksize − 2 down to 0 do
2.1. Q = 2Q
2.2. if ki = 1 then Q = Q+ P
end for
3. return(Q)
Algorithm 6.13 Modified double-and-add scalar multiplication algorithm (least-
to-most).
Inputs: P : A precomputed point, k: A key partition, ksize.
Output: kP : Partial scalar product.
Initialization:
1. Q = O, R = P
Scalar Multiplication:
2. for i = 0 to ksize − 1 do
2.1. if ki = 1 then Q = Q+R
2.2. R = 2R
end for
3. return(Q)
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Chapter 7
Results and Discussions
To evaluate our proposed secure ECC architectures (ECCSS and ECCPS) against
the reference non-secure architecture (ECCNS), the three architectures were mod-
eled using VHDL and synthesized on Xilinx FPGA. The developed VHDL models
are parameterized to allow synthesizing the cryptoprocessors with different archi-
tectural features. The developed VHDL allow for flexible definition of the following
parameters:
1. The elliptic curve parameters a and b.
2. The underlying field GF (2m).
3. The base point P .
4. The secret key k.
5. The number of key partitions for the secure ECCSS cryptoprocessor.
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6. The number of parallel scalar multiplication units for the secure ECCPS cryp-
toprocessor.
This chapter presents the results of synthesizing the various cryptoprocessors and
compares these three cryptoprocessors in terms of delay and area. Xilinx (xc2v8000)
FPGA has been used for prototyping. The reason for selecting such high capacity
FPGA is to use the same FPGA chip with the three cryptoprocessors. This is essen-
tial to ensure that delay and area comparisons are done for the same technology and
FPGA architecture and resources. The voltage trace of the ECCPS cryptoprocessor
is also illustrated and discussed in this chapter.
7.1 The ECCNS Cryptoprocessor
The three cryptoprocessors were designed to use the same field operation algorithms,
e.g., multiplication and inversion. Thus, performance difference between these cryp-
toprocessors is mainly a function of their control strategy and architectural differ-
ences independent of field operations. For example, field multiplication requires
(m + 2) clock cycles because of the sequential version of Sunar and Koc multiplier
(Section 6.1). Two clock cycles are required for conversion from and back to optimal
normal basis. Multiplication in the shifted basis requires m clock cycles. Point dou-
bling requires 5 field multiplications, 4 field additions and 6 squarings. Each field
addition and squaring requires only one clock cycle as a result of using optimal nor-
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mal basis. The total number of clock cycles required for performing point doubling
is 5(m+ 2) + 10, i.e., (5m+ 20) clock cycles.
Point addition, on the other hand, requires 14 field multiplications, 8 field addi-
tions and 6 squarings which requires 14(m + 2) + 14, i.e. (14m + 42) clock cycles.
Scalar multiplication requires, on the average, m point doubles and bm
2
c point addi-
tions, using the double-and-add algorithm. Thus, the required time to perform scalar
multiplication, on the average, is m(5m+ 20) + bm
2
c(14m+ 42), i.e. (12m2 + 41m)
clock cycles.
The ECCNS cryptoprocessor has been synthesized on the Xilinx FPGA (xc2v8000)
which contains 46592 Slices. Table 7.1 shows the synthesis results of scalar multipli-
cation with m = 14, 30, 65, 90 and 173 bits. As expected, these results show a linear
increase in area.
Table 7.1: The ECCNS Cryptoprocessor Synthesis Results.
m DBLs Adds Clock(MHz) Delay(µsec) Area Area
(Slices) Usage
14 14 7 93.954 31.14 1602 3%
30 30 15 74.235 162.05 3380 7%
65 65 32 64.595 826.15 8445 18%
90 90 45 60.055 1679.96 11933 25%
173 173 86 53.454 6851.52 27504 59%
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7.2 The ECCSS Cryptoprocessor
The ECCSS cryptoprocessor, presented in Chapter 6, has also been synthesized on
the same Xilinx FPGA (xc2v8000) with m = 14, 30, 65, 90 and 173 bits. For the
ECCSS cryptoprocessor, the number of point doubles remains the same as with
the ECCNS cryptoprocessor which is equal to m. The ECCSS cryptoprocessor
randomly encodes each key partition either in binary or NAF encoding.
Binary encoding requires, on the average, m
2
point additions, while NAF encoding
requires, on the average, only m
3
point additions. Thus, an average of 5
12
m point
additions will be performed due to the 1’s in the key partitions encoding (binary &
NAF). At the bit level, in the ECCSS cryptoprocessor, zeros of the key partitions
may randomly cause dummy point additions. Since key partitions may be encoded
either in binary or in NAF representation, an average of 7
24
m dummy point additions
are also required. Thus, the total number of point additions, on the average, is
17
24
m ' 0.7m.
The accumulation process of u partitions requires (u− 1) extra point additions.
Thus, the average total number of point additions required by the ECCSS cryp-
toprocessor is approximately (0.7m + u − 1). Table 7.2 shows the synthesis result
for u = 2, 3 and 4 key partitions for m = 14, 30, 65, 90 and 173 bits. Clearly, the
required time to perform scalar multiplication increases by increasing the number
of key partitions u since (u − 1) extra point additions are required for points ac-
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cumulation. The space, in terms of required number of slices on the Xilinx FPGA
(xc2v8000), also increases by increasing the number of key partitions u because of
the need to store more precomputed points.
To evaluate the performance of the secure cryptoprocessors ECCSS and ECCPS,
we will use the normalized area overhead and normalized delay overhead as measures
of performance.
The delay and area overhead of both processors are measured by the normalized
delay and area of both processors with respect to the sequential non-secure reference
cryptoprocessor ECCNS. Accordingly, the delay and area overheads are defined as:
Delay Overhead = ECCXS Delay
ECCNS Delay
and
Area Overhead = ECCXS Area
ECCNS Area
where ECCXS represents either the ECCSS or ECCPS cryptoprocessor.
For the ECCSS, Figure 7.1 shows that increasing the size of the underlying
field GF (2m) decreases the delay overhead since the number of required extra point
additions is only (u − 1) for u = 2, 3 and 4. Thus, if u is selected to be very large,
the delay overhead is going to increase significantly.
Likewise, the area overhead decreases as m is increased since the common mod-
ules are not changed. Figure 7.1 also shows that for m ≥ 65, increasing u does not
significantly increase the area overhead. Accordingly, more security against power
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analysis attacks can be attained by increasing u at the expense of more area and
delay overhead.
Table 7.2: The ECCSS Cryptoprocessor Synthesis Results.
m u DBLs Adds Clock Delay Delay Area Area
(MHz) (µsec) Overhead (Slices) Overhead
14 2 14 11 93.954 40.77 1.31 1873 1.169
14 3 14 12 93.954 43.30 1.39 1973 1.232
14 4 14 13 93.954 45.83 1.47 2002 1.249
30 2 30 22 74.172 205.79 1.27 3934 1.164
30 3 30 23 74.108 212.20 1.31 4110 1.216
30 4 30 24 74.108 218.44 1.35 4228 1.251
65 2 65 47 64.295 1037.29 1.25 9696 1.148
65 3 65 48 64.295 1052.10 1.27 10091 1.195
65 4 65 49 64.295 1066.91 1.29 10278 1.217
90 2 90 64 60.055 2091.88 1.24 13496 1.128
90 3 90 65 60.055 2113.56 1.26 14015 1.174
90 4 90 66 60.055 2135.24 1.27 14323 1.200
173 2 173 122 53.454 8492.52 1.24 31053 1.129
173 3 173 123 53.454 8538.62 1.25 31660 1.151
173 4 173 124 53.114 8639.67 1.26 32757 1.191
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Figure 7.1: The ECCSS Cryptoprocessor Delay and Area Overheads.
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7.3 The ECCPS Cryptoprocessor
As expected, since the ECCPS cryptoprocessor uses u parallel scalar multipliers,
it requires more hardware resources. Thus, for the Xilinx FPGA (xc2v8000), the
synthesis report shows that the ECCPS cryptoprocessor cannot fit with two or more
parallel scalar multiplication units with m = 173 bits. Thus, only GF (2m) fields
of m = 14, 30, 65 and 90 bits have been synthesized with up to four parallel scalar
multipliers.
Table 7.3 shows synthesis results of the ECCPS cryptoprocessor. Obviously,
increasing the number of key partitions u decreases the execution time of scalar
multiplication since all key partitions are processed in parallel. The required number
of FPGA slices, on the other hand, increases significantly by increasing u since the
number of scalar multiplication units also equals u.
Figure 7.2 shows the normalized delay and area overheads of the ECCPS cryp-
toprocessor with respect to the ECCNS cryptoprocessor. The efficiency, in terms of
delay and area overheads, clearly increases as the number of bits in the underlying
field GF (2m) increases.
The ECCPS cryptoprocessor has been implemented on Xilinx (xcv300) FPGA
with m = 11-bits on XESS XSV V1.1 board. In order to measure the trace of the
core logic power supply, a 1.2 Ω resistor has been placed in series with the core logic
power supply. Figure 7.3 shows the voltage ranges of the ECCPS cryptoprocessor
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with up to three parallel scalar multipliers. If only a single scalar multiplier is used,
point addition and point doubling can be easily distinguished, while with two scalar
multipliers, the voltage ranges are overlapped as shown in Figure 7.3.
Further, using three parallel scalar multipliers makes it very difficult to distin-
guish between different cases that may occur such as 2 doubling + 1 addition or 2
additions + 1 doubling. Parallel scalar multiplications also overlap field operations
across different scalar multipliers. The results depicted in Figure 7.3 clearly show
that parallelism is an effective countermeasure.
Table 7.3: The ECCPS Cryptoprocessor Synthesis Results.
m u DBLs Adds Clock Delay Delay Area Area
(MHz) (µsec) Overhead (Slices) Overhead
14 2 14 8 94.413 16.76 0.538 2902 1.812
14 3 14 9 94.311 12.02 0.386 4264 2.662
14 4 14 10 93.099 9.77 0.314 4837 3.0193
30 2 30 16 73.982 84.43 0.521 6091 1.802
30 3 30 17 73.700 58.59 0.362 8865 2.623
30 4 30 18 73.607 45.57 0.281 10089 2.985
65 2 65 33 63.127 426.96 0.521 14365 1.701
65 3 65 34 63.127 289.67 0.353 20423 2.418
65 4 65 35 62.990 221.50 0.270 23198 2.747
90 2 90 46 64.660 790.23 0.470 18467 1.548
90 3 90 47 64.998 530.84 0.316 27032 2.265
90 4 90 48 65.023 402.92 0.239 32113 2.691
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Figure 7.2: The ECCPS Cryptoprocessor Delay and Area Overheads.
7.4 ECCSS vs. ECCPS Comparison
The lower bound on the area-time cost of a given design is usually employed as a
performance metric (area) x (time)2α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, where the choice of α determines
the relative importance of area and time [108]. Such lower bounds have been ob-
tained for several problems, e.g., discrete Fourier transform, matrix multiplication,
binary addition, and others [108]. Once the lower bound on the chosen performance
metric is known, designers attempt to devise algorithms and designs which are op-
timal for a range of area and time values. Even though a design might be optimal
for a certain range of area and time values, it is nevertheless of interest to obtain
designs for minimum values of time, i.e., maximum speed performance, as well as
designs for minimum area. In order to make a more meaningful comparison between
the two secure cryptoprocessor architectures, both the AT and AT2 measures are
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Figure 7.3: The ECCPS Cryptoprocessor Voltage Trace with m = 11.
evaluated for both architectures.
The AT and AT2 performance metrics were studied for both secure architectures.
In one case, AT and AT2 of both designs are studied for various key sizes with a
fixed number of key partitions (u = 4) and in another case for a fixed key size
(m = 173) and variable number of key partitions. For the first case, the number
of key partitions is fixed at u = 4 while the values of m = 14, 30, 65, 90 and 173
were considered. Table 7.4 shows the normalized AT and AT2 for the ECCSS
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and the ECCPS cryptoprocessors for u = 4 key partitions since it provides more
resistance against power analysis attacks. Figures 7.4 and 7.5 show the AT and AT2
complexities respectively. The results shown in Figures 7.4 and 7.5 indicate that the
ECCPS cryptoprocessor has better AT and AT
2 performance metrics compared to
the ECCSS cryptoprocessor.
For the second case, the key size is fixed at m = 173 while several values for the
number of key partitions (u = 10, 20, 30, 40, 50 and 60) were considered. The delay
overhead of the ECCSS and the ECCPS cryptoprocessors can be approximated as:
ECCSS Delay Overhead =
(m)DBLCC+(0.7m+u−1)ADDCC
(m)DBLCC+
m
2
ADDCC
and
ECCPS Delay Overhead =
(m)DBLCC+
m
2 ADDCC
u
(m)DBLCC+
m
2
ADDCC
where DBLCC and ADDCC are the required clock cycles for performing point dou-
bling and point addition respectively. Tables 7.2 and 7.3 show that the normalized
area overhead of the ECCSS and the ECCPS cryptoprocessors increases at an ap-
proximately rate of 5% and 50% respectively per each additional key partition. The
AT and AT2 measures over GF (2173), with variable number of key partitions u,
are depicted in Figures 7.6 and 7.7 respectively. The results of Figures 7.6 and 7.7
show that the ECCPS cryptoprocessor also enjoys better AT and AT
2 with more
key partitions than the ECCSS cryptoprocessor.
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Table 7.4: Area-Time Complexity Comparison for u = 4.
m
ECCss ECCps
AT AT2 AT AT2
14 1.84 2.71 0.947 0.297
30 1.68 2.27 0.839 0.236
65 1.57 2.03 0.742 0.201
90 1.53 1.94 0.645 0.155
Figure 7.4: The Area-Time Complexity for u = 4.
7.5 Summary
In this chapter, three elliptic curve cryptoprocessor architectures for curves defined
over GF (2m) have been modeled using VHDL. The developed VHDL models are
parameterized to allow synthesizing the cryptoprocessors with different architectural
features.
Synthesis results for the proposed secure sequential cryptoprocessor show that
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Figure 7.5: The Area-Time2 Complexity for u = 4.
increasing the number of key partitions slightly increases the area. In contrast,
increasing the number of key partitions for the proposed parallel cryptoprocessor
significantly increases the space requirements since several scalar multipliers are
employed.
The sequential cryptoprocessor requires more point additions than the reference
non-secure cryptoprocessor so as to accumulate the results of the key partitions. For
the parallel cryptoprocessor, however, a significant overall speedup is obtained since
several scalar multipliers are used.
The AT and AT2 performance measures for the proposed secure cryptoprocessors
show that the parallel cryptoprocessor has better AT and AT2 compared to the
sequential cryptoprocessor.
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Figure 7.6: The Approximated Area-Time Complexity for m = 173.
The three cryptoprocessor has been implemented on a Xilinx FPGA and the
voltage trace of the core logic of the parallel cryptoprocessor has been measured for
different parallel point operations to demonstrate resistance against power analy-
sis attacks. The results show that using the parallel cryptoprocessor significantly
confuses leaked information without performing extra dummy point operations.
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Figure 7.7: The Approximated Area-Time2 Complexity for m = 173.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Research
In this dissertation, three elliptic curve cryptoprocessor architectures for curves de-
fined over GF (2m) have been modeled using VHDL. The developed VHDL models
are parameterized to allow synthesizing the cryptoprocessors with different archi-
tectural features. The proposed architectures allow designers to tailor performance
and hardware requirements according to their performance and cost objectives.
Two of these architectures are proposed as being secure against power analy-
sis attacks, while the non-secure one has been used as a reference model for area
and delay comparisons. The proposed power analysis attack resistant cryptoproces-
sors include one sequential and another parallel cryptoprocessor architectures. The
sequential cryptoprocessor architecture uses multilevel resistance measures against
power analysis attacks. These include resistance measures at the key level, the key
partition level, and at the bit level.
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At the key level, the key is divided into a number of partitions which are se-
quentially processed in a randomized order. The encoding of each key partition is
randomly selected to be either in binary or in Non-Adjacent-Form (NAF) at the key
partition level. Furthermore, at the key partition level, the direction of bit inspection
for binary encoded key partitions is randomly assigned to be either most-to-least or
least-to-most. Finally, the zeros, at the bit level, are randomized to appear some-
times as ones by performing dummy point additions. The sequential cryptoprocessor
architecture certainly makes it very difficult for cryptanalysts to infer the key from
leaked information in such multilevel resistance secure environment.
The proposed parallel cryptoprocessor provides high speed through using parallel
scalar multipliers that operate in parallel on different key partitions. Parallel scalar
multiplications of different key partitions are exploited as a countermeasure against
power analysis attacks. Furthermore, the inspection order of each key partition is
randomly decided to increase the immunity against power analysis attacks. The
parallel cryptoprocessor does not need extra dummy operations as performed in the
sequential processor. Hence, high performance gain is achieved while at the same
time providing adequate resistance against power analysis attacks.
For the proposed secure sequential cryptoprocessor, synthesis results show that
increasing the number of key partitions slightly increases the area. In contrast,
increasing the number of key partitions for the proposed parallel cryptoprocessor
significantly increases the space requirements since parallel scalar multipliers are
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employed. The time complexity of the sequential cryptoprocessor requires more
point additions than the reference non-secure cryptoprocessor so as to accumulate
the results of various key partitions. However, for the parallel cryptoprocessor, a
significant overall speedup is obtained.
Furthermore, the AT and AT2 performance measures for the proposed secure
cryptoprocessors have been evaluated. The results show that the proposed paral-
lel cryptoprocessor has better AT and AT2 compared to the proposed sequential
cryptoprocessor.
In order to demonstrate resistance against power analysis attacks, the parallel
cryptoprocessor has been implemented on a Xilinx FPGA and the voltage trace
of the core logic has been measured for different parallel point operations. The
results have shown that using the parallel cryptoprocessor significantly confuses
leaked information.
Future research may further investigate the following:
1. Exploring the sequential-parallel mixed design.
2. Finding an optimal configuration with the best number of key partitions.
3. Evaluating both architectures on other ASIC platforms (e.g. standard cells).
4. Extending the same ideas to hyper-elliptic curves which require less number
of bits (80-bits).
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